NEWS AND NOTES
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The online-only "News and Notes" section of *Tradition and Discovery* includes bibliographic information, calls for papers, annual meeting programs, and any other items possibly of interest to members of the Polanyi Society and other persons working with the thought of Michael Polanyi. Send material to Paul Lewis, Editor of *Tradition and Discovery,* at lewis_pa@mercer.edu.

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2018 Nashotah House Polanyi Society Conference

By the time you receive this digital copy of "News and Notes," the 6-9 June 2018 Polanyi Society-sponsored conference "Michael Polanyi and the Post-Critical Turn" at Nashotah House in Nashotah, WI, will have recently concluded. The plan is, however, to leave the several papers posted for the conference on the Polanyi Society web site for a few weeks after the conference. So if you want to review any of this material, you can return to www.polanyisociety.org and look for the link to conference materials.

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November 2018 Polanyi Society Annual Meeting

The 2018 annual meeting of the Polanyi Society will be in Denver, Colorado in conjunction with the annual meeting of the American Academy of Religion. The Polanyi Society is one of several designated Related Scholarly Organizations of the umbrella AAR organization and is therefore fortunate to be allocated AAR space for Society meetings. You do not need to register for the AAR meeting in order to attend the Society meetings.

We expect to have sessions with papers on **Friday, November 16, 2018**, and **Saturday, November 17, 2018**. At the time this issue of TAD's "News and Notes" was assembled, the program is being finalized, but there will be either two or three sessions with papers. The basic 2018 program will be posted on www.polanyisociety.org as soon as it is available and should also be in the October 2018 TAD "News and Notes." Normally, the times and locations of sessions are posted in the late summer or early fall and papers are posted in early November.

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Recent Publications

The Department of Philosophy and History of Science at Budapest University of Technology and Economics sponsored a Philosophy and Technology workshop on December 1 and 2, 2017. At the following address, you can find authors, essay titles and instructions about how to receive a

revised copy of workshop essays of interest: http://budpt.eu/2017/papers/. A book including these essays is currently under consideration. Two essays make use of Michael Polanyi's ideas or are focused on Polanyi's ideas. The titles, authors, and abstracts for these two are below.

Mihály Héder, "Michael Polanyi and the Epistemology of Engineering."

Abstract: In his main monograph, Michael Polanyi promotes a new philosophy, the "fiduciary program," which is meant to tackle problems facing humanity. At its core, there is a new epistemology called Personal Knowledge, which is also the title of the book. This includes a comprehensive description of the epistemology of engineering as a distinct mode of knowing with its own characteristics, along with Polanyi's other two categories, "natural" and "exact" sciences. In this article, Polanyi's engineering epistemology is reconstructed and evaluated. Polanyi states that all knowledge is either tacit or rooted in the tacit, and also explains how it originated from inarticulate animal knowledge. The knowledge of engineers is rooted in evolution in what Polanyi calls Type A learning, which involves a heuristic act of contrivance. For animals, this is essential for discovering means-ends-relationships. For human engineers the situation is not at all different. They harbor a particular kind of intellectual passion, the heuristic passion for discovering novel and economic ways for achieving goals. What they discover are certain kinds of rules of rightness: operational principles of machines. This concept is part of Polanyi's hierarchical ontology. According to Polanyi, our material world has multiple levels of existence. Some things—living organizations and machines—are more real than everything else, because they are not merely material: they are emergent. In Polanyi's view, there is nothing extraordinary about these entities, as they are part of nature. As such, they should be accounted for by science just like any other phenomena. And, in fact, science does this, but it does not reflect this fact because it tends to employ a faulty methodology. Emergent entities come into existence-or emerge-from matter. This is possible because the laws of matter leave room for higher level laws-rules of rightness to operate. In the context of machines, these higher-level laws are called operational principles. The correctly implemented machine can operate flawlessly as long as the material conditions do not deteriorate outside limits. The knowledge of the engineer is about these rules of rightness. From this, it follows that discovery in engineering means finding new operational principles. But the rules of rightness cannot account for faulty behavior. Failures always have material causes; therefore, the engineering profession entails a good grasp of material sciences. I will argue that this approach can be the conceptual basis for basic engineering research that is in contrast with applied science, the category engineering usually falls into.

Phil Mullins, "Michael Polanyi on Machines as Comprehensive Entities."

Keywords: Michael Polanyi, comprehensive entity, emergence, deep learning, neural network.
Abstract: This essay analyzes Michael Polanyi's ideas about what he calls a "comprehensive entity." It focuses on the way Polanyi compares and contrasts living beings and machines as "comprehensive entities." In particular, I examine Polanyi's mid-century account of computers as machines and suggest that contemporary deep learning neural networks operating in digital culture suggest some of Polanyi's thinking needs to be recast.

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David Atkinson, "Seeking Truth and Freedom in a Post-Truth World" is available online in *Ekklesia* (http://www.ekklesia.co.uk/node/25465).

Abstract: How do Christians and others of good faith speak truthfully and act justly, with freedom and responsibility, in a world which seems increasingly characterized by the manipulations and distortions of power? This two-part essay considers such questions in the light of the work of philosopher Michael Polanyi. After introducing the life and work of Michael Polanyi, the first part focuses on two key themes in Polanyi's thought: the way of discovery and the personal component in all knowledge and the key role of a society of explorers. In the second part of the essay, these insights are related to a number of areas of Christian speech and action and the church's witness.

Mark Mitchell, "Michael Polanyi, Alasdair MacIntyre, and the Role of Tradition," *Humanitas*, Volume XIX, Nos. 1 and 2, (2006): 97-125 is available via a link in this volume on the web at http://www.nhinet.org/19-1&2.htm.

Abstract: The work of both MacIntyre and Polanyi seeks to overcome the failings of modernity by transcending it. In large part they arrive at similar conclusions. Both MacIntyre and Polanyi argue that the modern project is self-destructive, and they both offer avenues to transcend these self-destructive tendencies. The solutions they offer seek to recover important pre-modern concepts such as tradition, belief, authority, and practice. As such, their respective solutions offer a potentially fruitful alternative to the enlightenment–postmodern dilemma.

Mitchell recently wrote that he used "parts of this article in a forthcoming book titled 'The Limits of Liberalism: Tradition, Individualism, and the Crisis of Freedom.' Notre Dame is publishing it—coming out sometime in the fall [2018]. In it I argue that the modern mind is characterized by a rejection of tradition and then show that this is incoherent philosophically and destructive socially and politically. I have chapters on Oakeshott, MacIntyre, and Polanyi. Wally Mead graciously read and commented on a draft."

Jon Fennell, "Can Alasdair MacIntyre Relieve Grene's Polanyian Regret?," *Humanitas*, Volume XXX, Nos. 1 and 2, (2017): 30-58 is available via a link in this volume on the web at http://www.nhinet.org/30-1.htm .

Abstract: In her address to the Polanyi Centennial Conference, Marjorie Grene expresses regret regarding her failure to recognize sooner what she now understands to be Polanyi's arbitrary, inconsistent, and embarrassing retreat from his earlier admirable admission of the contingency and fallibility of his own position. Bearing significantly on the issues raised by Grene is a seminal essay by Alasdair MacIntyre. That Grene's regret is unnecessary becomes evident if we join Polanyi in his impressive attempt to achieve ultimate consistency. Of special interest is whether MacIntyre is more successful than Polanyi is escaping Grene's ire. And, in light of Polanyi's position, how ought we to regard that of MacIntyre? What is at issue is nothing less than our understanding of what it means to be a thoughtful human being.

Fennell's essay originated as a 2016 Polanyi Society annual meeting paper. His analysis of Marjorie Grene's late comments on Polanyi appeared recently in this open access NEH electronic journal with a history of interest in Polanyi. Interestingly, Michael Polanyi and a few Manchester colleagues produced in 1946 and 1947 four issues of a journal whose title was also *Humanitas*.

Gábor István Bíró's review of *The Handbook of Science and Technology Studies* (4th ed.) was recently published in *The Berlin Review of Books* (http://berlinbooks.org/brb/2018/01/the-changing-faces-of-sts/). Bíró, who is interested in Polanyi's links to STS studies, noted that he briefly explores "the evolution of the 'reflexive landscaping' of STS scholars as mirrored in the sequence of handbooks from the 1970s till the recently published 4th volume."

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Articles in *Appraisal*, Spring 2018 (Vol. 11, No. 4)

Phil Mullins and Struan W. Jacobs, "Polanyi's Early Work on Knowledge," 4-13.

Abstract: Michael Polanyi's early writing—some published but also unpublished material—shows he was deeply puzzled by, and was probing, matters concerned with human knowledge. This early material, which is sometimes provocative and not particularly systematic, has been largely overlooked in the extant Polanyi literature. Although this short essay does not discuss any of the pieces in detail, we review a selection of Polanyi's early writing. Visible in this material are some seeds of what later are developed in Polanyi's account of science and society, and his epistemology, which by the 1960s he called the 'theory of tacit knowing.' We also illuminate some tensions among ideas with which Polanyi seems to be experimenting. In sum, this essay examines a selection of early Polanyi writing, briefly discussing what appears to be Polanyi's early questions about knowledge and his thinking about human knowing in science and society in the late 1920s and 30s.

J. Edward Hackett, "Why Ethics is a Normative Science: on Brightman's Moral Laws," 14-24.

Abstract: By normative science, I mean that (i) ethics is like logic in the sense that it actively tries to arrive at knowledge of objective norms that apply to all people at all place and at all times and that moreover, (ii) ethicists have a particular expertise about the content of their discipline in the same way that the law professor or physicist claims in their own respective fields if ethics can be made scientific in the normative sense. In what follows, I explain Edgar Sheffield Brightman's (1884-1953) model of ethics described in his Moral Laws and evaluate his reasons for thinking that ethics is a normative science. Along this argumentative journey, I adopt Brightman's language as I walk with the reader in the text almost to appear as if I am endorsing the view of ethics as a normative science. In writing this way, I want to experiment with this thought as if I had adopted it.

Simon Smith, "In Defence of Basic Facts: Neurobiology and the Social Structure of Intending," 25-32.

Abstract: This article addresses a fundamental issue in both philosophy of mind and social ontology. It concerns John R. Searle's claim that the facts underlying human intentionality are neurobiological. Combining materialist reduction with a metaphysical isolationism that locates intentions inside the individual's head proves as disastrous to the analysis of a social or personal reality as it does to conceptions of human consciousness. Intentions, it is argued, occur, not inside agents, but in the transactions between agents them. Ignoring the fundamentally social structure of intentions disconnects agents from the co-operative activity that constitutes a social world, thereby eliminating the very thing Searle sought to explain.

Abigail Klassen, "Why We (Sometimes) Can't Really Share Intentions and Why it (Sometimes) Doesn't Matter," 33-36.

Abstract: In John R. Searle's *The Construction of Social Reality* (1995), 'We-intentions' are proffered to account for the cooperative nature of human collective intentionality, which he argues cannot be secured by analyses that reduce group intentions to individuals' intentions (even when supplemented with individuals' beliefs about others' intentions and beliefs). Searle may be correct to argue that such reductionist analyses fail, but his own account is ultimately untenable as well. That is, (i) his account cannot ensure that intentions really are shared (as opposed to merely presupposed as shared) and (ii) is excessively restrictive in what it can accommodate as a case of collective intention. I then examine J. David Velleman's "How To Share An Intention" (1997). Velleman's article is a revisitation and revamping of Searle's 1995 account of collective intentionality. The interest of this short paper lies in the relation of individual and collective intentions, as understood by Searle and others, to questions surrounding the epistemology and metaphysics of the social science. I extend the category of 'intention' from Searle's (1995) limiting stance that intentions exist in heads to include *public* speech acts and written assertions. I suggest that Velleman's revisitation suffers from the same two difficulties as the Searlian program, namely problems (i) and (ii) as articulated above. I then turn to the idea that Searle's conceptual analysis does not serve us well in the project of (i) explaining how and why ascriptions of collective intention figure in macro-level explanations advanced by the social sciences and (ii) why such ascriptions are not easily eliminable. When social scientists attempt to analyse or predict group intentions and behaviours, reference to the actual intentions of the members is not necessarily required and in some cases, may even be inappropriate. Looking for explanations at the micro-level alone can omit features that are common between social group types with differing supervenience bases—that is, groups composed of different individuals with different individual and collective intentions.

R. T. Allen, "The Personalist Ethics of W. R. Sorley," 37-42.

Abstract: William Ritchie Sorley introduced into British philosophy the new axiology of value, combined it with an ethics primarily of character and virtues and personal fulfilment as the aim and guide necessary for the proper conduct of life. In *The Ethics of Naturalism* he exposed the errors of the Utilitarians' hedonist axiology. He presented his version of ethics of virtue in *The Moral Life and Moral Worth*, and developed it, in the context of a personalist epistemology and a

metaphysics which does full justice to personal existence and its values and goal, in *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, which is then taken as the clue to a personalist and thus theist cosmology.

Alan Ford, "Modernity: No Place for Persons," 43-45.

Abstract: My aim is to show how the implicit metaphysical background to modernity, commencing with Descartes and still in play today, must make the articulation of the ethical, and value in general, highly problematic, providing at best a strangled voice for their expression. This strangled voice is clearly represented by Wittgenstein's attempt to articulate value, to say the unsayable, in his *Tractatus*, and I attempt to use this and other sources to sketch a 'metaphysics of modernity', which I see as a construct resulting from the key notions of subjectivity and objectivity on the one hand, and of form and content on the other. This creates four broad categories in which the notions of the 'transcendental' and the 'factic' (Sartre's term) play crucial roles. I argue that this must result in an entirely illogical, and unnecessary mystification of the notions of *value*, the *self* and *personhood*, since there is no coherent place for such logically essential notions in this hidden metaphysics, which has slipped surreptitiously into our thinking, making important aspects of it basically irrational. I argue for a radical change in logical priorities, with the ethical in pole position.

James Beauregard, "John Macmurray, Object Relations Theory and Contemporary Neuroscience," 46-54.

Abstract: Psychoanalytic Object Relations Theory had an under-appreciated impact on the work of Scottish philosopher John Macmurray. This paper seeks to highlight this influence and to suggest ways in which Macmurray's thought can inform contemporary neuroscientific notions of person. The sciences in general, and contemporary neuroscience in particular, seek to define, rather than describe or recognize, what a person is in categories that cannot fully capture who we are as we live and act in an interpersonal world. Macmurray's Field of the Personal provides us with a conceptual architecture to examine contemporary neuroscience, to gain a clear vision of strengths, as well as its limitations, and to develop a fuller notion of the human person that can take into account the findings of contemporary science, while at the same time not being limited to these findings and the conceptual assumptions that under-gird them.

This paper will argue that Macmurray's thought is particularly suited to addressing contemporary neuroscientific debates in terms of our understanding of who/what a human person is, and also addressing specific neuroscientific and ethical issues such as free will and human autonomy, neuroscientific research, the ethical uses of neuroimaging technology, current debates around the use of neurologic criteria in brain death, the use of neuroscience in forensic settings and national security concerns. Macmurray's insights into the nature of the human person provide a methodology and a vision that can address ethical issues in the domains of personhood, person as agent, social justice and political decision-making. His Field of the Personal, informed as it is by Object Relations thinking, gives us a way to recognise problematic issues in contemporary neuroscience and to offer a constructive solution through a deeper vision of the human person adequately conceived.

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At the end of October in 2017, **John Hess** finished his Ph. D. at Middlesex University, UK. Below is a summary of his thesis, "A Polanyian Tack: Political Implications," and a comment by an examiner. The full dissertation is available online at the following address: http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/22685/6/JHess%20Thesis_final.pdf.

My thesis raises the question of intellectual freedom and its relationship to social freedom and truth; it is Polanyian in character. Intellectual freedom justifies social freedom and is justified by the pursuit of truth. Intellectual freedom, I propose, is best understood as the creative exercise of tacit knowing. Liberalism's intellectual freedom misunderstands truth and how it is pursued. It either overemphasizes (1) critical doubt; or (2) Community, Authority and Tradition (CAT.) (1) leads to nihilism; and (2) leads to totalitarianism; both (1) and (2) eliminate intellectual freedom. As proposed, intellectual freedom is the creative exercise of tacit knowing in discovering truth (or other transcendent ideals): Tacit knowing presupposes CAT on the *from* side of tacit knowledge's notation and overcomes CAT's constraints by going *to* truth. Tacit knowing re-establishes truth, re-habilitates CAT and recreates the conditions of social freedom. Broadly, I bring into discourse Michael Polanyi's early work and its triadic structure of social freedom with his later epistemology and its triadic structure of knowing to establish the relations of social freedom, intellectual freedom and truth. Polanyi's theory of tacit knowing is re-forged into a CAT—intellectual freedom—truth triad to give a new understanding of intellectual freedom. The re-forged triad yields a stereoscopic (social and epistemic) understanding of intellectual freedom.

Comment by Professor Karl Simms, University of Liverpool: "There is much to like about this thesis. The abstract claims that it makes 'an original contribution to Polanyian scholarship', but it actually does rather more than that: its uses and adapts the thought of Polanyi to develop a new theory of the relation of the moral grounds of human being in Community, Authority and Tradition (CAT) to the development of a 'free and good society'. It is therefore of interest beyond the narrow bounds of Polanyi scholarship and has the potential to make significant impact in the sphere of social and political philosophy more generally."

In Memoriam: Raymond E. Wilken[1]

Phil Mullins

Ray Wilken died on May 5, 2018, at the age of 90 in Sebring, OH. Ray was professor of education theory at Kent State University from 1967 until his retirement several years ago. When he vacated his Kent State office, he sent Phil Mullins, then the editor of *TAD*, boxes of interesting early materials on or by Polanyi and the work of the early organizations in North American that eventually became the Polanyi Society. Ray's interest in and work on Polanyi dates back to the early 1960s. He was an Illinois farm boy who in 1950 earned a B.S. that launched his secondary-education teaching career in agriculture and biology. After two years in

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[1] This memorial note draws freely from the obituary that was published in the *Record-Courier*, Kent, Ohio, on Wednesday, May 23, 2018. Thanks also go to Kim Sebaly, Ray Wilken's long-term Kent State colleague and friend.

the U.S. Army, he earned two masters degrees, one in education and another in biology. Because he was an excellent teacher, Ray was selected as a National Science Foundation biology scholar to work in programs at the University of Alaska and at Harvard in the late 1950s. He taught part-time in botany and secondary education at the University of Illinois from 1961-1966 while he worked on his Ph.D. in Theoretical Foundations of Education with Harry Broudy, a leading philosopher of education with an interest in Polanyi.

During his graduate studies, as Ray Wilken became more interested in the thought of Michael Polanyi and its relevance for education, he took the bold step of arranging three interviews when Polanyi was in the U.S. giving lectures in the 1960s. When Polanyi was in residence as a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study at Wesleyan University, Ray recorded and later transcribed his first Polanyi interview on April 5 and 6, 1966. This is one of the best but least known Polanyi interviews, covering many topics; Ray and Kim Sebaly were instrumental in preparing this interview and a transcript which is posted here on the Polanyi Society web site. On April 24 and 25, 1967, while Polanyi was at the University of Chicago, Wilken recorded an additional interview; there is no transcript of this interview but the audio tapes may eventually be posted. On May 1 and 4, 1969, Wilken interviewed (but did not record) Polanyi for the final time. Wilken's dissertation, "The Relation of Polanyi's Theory of Personal Knowledge to the Teaching of Biology," completed under Harry Broudy at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign draws on his interviews.

Ray and his graduate students organized two important early academic meetings focusing on Polanyi's thought. The first, in 1984, treated Polanyi's relevance to education. The relationship of Polanyi's thought to educational studies became the cornerstone of Wilken's professorship at Kent. He focused the attention of his students on the question, "What does it mean to be educated, and what does it mean to teach?" The meaning of humanness and the role of science and education in a free society were central concerns throughout his teaching career. Wilken developed an innovative series of courses in the philosophy of education, including "Education and the Personal Dimension," "Tacit Knowing," and "Meaning and Education." These courses also helped shape his contributions to Kent's unique interdisciplinary program in gerontology, especially through a new course, "Educational Dimensions of Leisure, Retirement, and Aging." Back when the Polanyi Society was organized in terms of disciplinary coordinators, Ray Wilken served as the Society's advisor for "Educational Studies" from 1972-1999.

The second Kent State Polanyi conference Ray and his graduate students put together was the 1991 centenary conference, which was perhaps the largest Polanyi conference ever held with more than 100 persons attending. The plenary speakers included John Polanyi, Marjorie Grene, Edward Shils, William T. Scott, and others. There were many papers presented by conference participants, most of which are included in a volume the late Richard Gelwick pulled together and the Polanyi Society published in 1997, *From Polanyi to the 21st Century: Proceedings of a Centennial Conference, Kent State University, April 11-13, 1991*.

Outside his academic life, Ray was known for his generous hospitality, his good cooking, his collection of opera and classical music recordings, his bird watching, and the many species of dahlias he planted in community gardens, which magnificently bloomed at the end of summer. A

memorial service for Ray was held June 7, 2018, at Copeland Oaks where he lived. Memorial tributes to Ray Wilken can be sent to the Polanyi Society Travel Fund (for younger scholars), c/o Dr. Charles Lowney, Polanyi Society Treasurer, 10 Jordan St. Lexington, VA, 24450.

Future Additions to the Polanyi Society Web Site

There are several projects in the early stages for additions to the Polanyi Society web site (polanyisociety.org). One of these involves posting and perhaps indexing all of the old issues of *Convivium*. *Convivium* was the publication of the UK Polanyi group of the same name, which was produced from the mid-seventies until about 1990. Like the early versions of the predecessors of *TAD*, *Convivium* was first a newsletter and then a mini-journal. There were many interesting articles and reviews in *Convivium*. In fact some but not all of the material in early issues *Convivium* was re-printed in *TAD* and vice versa. The UK group Convivium was folded into the Polanyi Society about 1992 and former *Convivium* subscribers began to receive and contribute directly to *TAD*.

If you happen to have in your files any copies of *Convivium* or know anyone who does, please e-mail Phil Mullins (mullins@missouriwestern.edu). We have been able to locate many, but not all, *Convivium* issues and hope to find missing issues.

Polanyi Bibliography Update Project

Maben Poirer compiled a massive 430 plus page bibliography of writings by and about Michael Polanyi which became available in 2002. It is titled *A Classified and Partially Annotated Bibliography of all Forms of Publications, Sound Recordings, Internet Documents, etc., by and about the Anglo-Hungarian Philosopher of Science Michael Polanyi* and was published by Canadian Scholars' Press, Inc. There is an interview of Poirer in *TAD* 29:2 (pp. 44-49) which provides interesting details about the organization of this bibliography, the problems of making it, and other Polanyi bibliographies. Although the Poirer bibliography is now out of print, it likely can be found in some university libraries and may even be available via the interlibrary loan system.

Colin Cordner, a former student of Poirer, is in the process of updating this Polanyi bibliography. He is adding pieces originally overlooked as well as Polanyi materials that have been published since 2002. If you have published something Polanyi-related after 2002 which you think should be mentioned in this bibliography (i.e., something that has not appeared in the primary Polanyi journals, *TAD*, *Polanyiana* or *Appraisal*, or been noted in *TAD*'s "News and Notes" section), please notify Colin Cordner (ccordner@connect.carleton.ca). If you are aware of an error in the citations in the Poirier bibliography or in any of the several other Polanyi bibliographies, please send the correction along to Cordner.

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Donations to the Travel Fund, the Richard Gelwick Fund, and the Polanyi Society Endowment

The Polanyi Society's Travel Fund and the Richard Gelwick Fund enable younger scholars to participate in Society meetings. One of the Society's goals is to involve persons who are presently, or have recently, been engaged in their graduate studies. But making this happen in the midst of the increasing burden of student loans, the escalation of travel costs, and diminishing university resources available to facilitate such involvement is a daunting challenge. Society meetings are held in different places in North America and in some years there are two meetings so demands on these Society funds are different in different years. We need continually to replenish these special funds.

The Polanyi Society Endowment was established a few years ago with a gift from Ann Herbert Scott, the widow of William T. Scott, the original Polanyi biographer. Slowly, the Endowment is growing. The eventual aim is to have an Endowment that generates each year some resources which can be used to support an expand Polanyi Society programming.

Please support these funds by sending a tax deductible contribution to The Polanyi Society, C/O Charles Lowney, 10 Jordan Street, Lexington, VA 24450. Checks should be made out to the Polanyi Society and marked Travel Fund, Gelwick Fund or Endowment (or general operating). You can also directly access the Polanyi Society PayPal button to make a donation (http://polanyisociety.org/paypal/donate.html). The actual PayPal transaction is handled on the secure PayPal site.

Back Printed Issues of *TAD* Available for Purchase

A limited number of back issues of *TAD* are available for purchase as long as supplies last. The cost for a copy of issues up to and including Vol. 41:3 is $5.00. A copy of issues from 42:1 on is $7.00. All prices include shipping and handling. For issues up to and including Vol. 39:2, contact Phil Mullins (mullins@missouriwestern.edu). For issues from 39:3 to the present, contact Paul Lewis (lewis_pa@mercer.edu). Payment should be sent to The Polanyi Society, C/O Charles Lowney, 10 Jordan Street, Lexington, VA 24450. Checks should be made out to the Polanyi Society and earmarked for back issues.

A Note About Membership

If you receive the print issue of *Tradition and Discovery*, your membership expiration date is on your mailing label. Dues notices are sent out with the October issue and must be paid by December 31. The membership secretary will contact folks after the first of the year, but it may result in missing the February issue. Remember that the Polanyi Society is a small organization

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with limited resources used for many projects. If you receive only the digital *TAD*, you are not required to have an official subscription; nevertheless, you will be welcomed as a dues-paying member.