Lecture 3. The Necessity of Philosophy.

(c) The Validation of Social Lore.

1. The integral part which I have ascribed to emotions in all intellectual performances is a clear challenge to the ideal of dispassionate reason. It stands in sharp conflict to the aim of critical philosophy to eliminate all emotive elements of thought which inevitably interfere with its objectivity. The contemporary school of linguistic analysis has to some extent recognised this situation by registering the emotional content of language as part of its meaningful message. However, a dispassionate scrutiny of our passions inevitably reduces them to a merely subjective status, and thus debars us from giving ourselves to those passions which alone can carry our own convictions. The next step of our survey should convince us that this attitude is untenable and that a philosophy which would strive for such detachment would necessarily renounce its proper and indeed indispensable services.

2. I have listed before three classes of interpersonal articulation, which— in re-arranged sequence— may be described as follows. (1) communication concerning objects (2) direct convivial exchanges. (3) communication concerning persons. These three elementary forms underlie three vast regions of intellectual life which are brought into view by recalling the collective character of all articulation. The common acceptance of an idiom by a group which transmits its usage from generation to generation makes possible the development and continued cultivation through the centuries of complex systems of articulation. I shall describe this cultural heritage as 'social lore' and classify certain forms of this lore, with the understanding...
that each section of it is maintained by appropriate institutions, which I shall not be able to describe here in detail. and looser organisations. I wish these to be kept in mind. though I shall be able to mention them only in a brief and rather cursory manner.

3. The first section of social lore, which is based on communication about objects, has already been dealt with previously under the heading of object-directed intellectual performances, expressed in an articulate form. We may recall its three subdivisions: Observation, which included empirical science; Invention, comprising all practical arts, and Interpretation, containing the deductive sciences, as well as pictorial and musical art. While for the purposes of analysis all these mental activities have been previously described as the performances of an individual, they are now brought into this survey of social lore by taking notice of the obvious fact that they form great systems vastly exceeding what any man can produce by himself; or even get to know and master completely.

We may recall that the amplification of our original list of object-directed articulate intellectual performances by their emotional components has much attenuated the denotative character of the articulation involved in them. Having recognised the constitutive part played by intellectual beauty within mathematics I expanded the object-directed field to include pictorial and musical art, which made it clear that it possesses throughout a manner of justification derived from internal evidence rather than from reference to objects beyond itself. While this type of intelligence constitutes a wide range of straightforward relations, and to this extent in cognitive and manipulative, its I-It duality is contracted in mathematics, painting and - most completely - in music, into the unity of an existential act. I shall allow for this, however imperfectly, by replacing the heading 'object directed' by the term 'cognitive', to describe the whole range of social lore which does not
refer to persons; or perhaps more precisely, not to persons as persons.

In its cognitive lore society includes at all times a fund of information considered to be true. In our own days this fund is enormous and includes what is accepted as scientific knowledge. In every society there are established a number of organizational processes by which information is thought to be reliably acquired, among which we may include the transmission of the currently accepted fund of information to the succeeding generations. These processes and the information derived from them, differ profoundly from one society to another and there are discrepancies even within a single group of people inhabiting the same territory and forming in most respects a single society. Sharply distinctive beliefs concerning the proper sources and valid content of information are held for example today in England by certain compact minorities like astrologers or members of the Communist Party. In spite of similar divisions of artistic appreciation, a society at any particular time may be said to possess a pictorial and a musical art.

4. I pass on to the part of social lore based on the kind of articulation which I have covered by the name of 'direct convivial exchanges'. This comprises the whole interplay of give and take which essentially constitutes social life. There is not a stage of our existence from the instant of our birth to the last span of consciousness before our extinction in which we do not make claims on others or submit to their claims on us. A society may be said to possess an order, and thus be truly called a society to the extent to which it possesses a binding system of proprieties, regulating these interpersonal claims and counter-claims. There exists in such a society a system of
mores, in the form of preponderantly accepted manners, customs and law; including certain agreed modes of enforcing these mores on defaulters and dissenters, and of bringing up the young to respect them. There may also exist an organised process by which the existing system of rules can be legitimately amplified or amended. The code of behaviour in society is interwoven with its cognitive lore and particularly with its technology; it is also profoundly affected by religious beliefs and no less by the current conception of man and human affairs, neither of which I have yet dealt with. Strictly speaking, I ought to include religious worship among social lore based on direct convivial exchanges. For God is a person, and worship is our way of addressing God and submitting to his guidance. But I will not elaborate on this perspective as I wish to appeal mainly to the secular outlook and to retain therefore philosophy as my main subject. To the social lore from which society derives its interpretation of man and human affairs I shall turn in a moment. But before passing on to this I must secure a suitable term by which to refer back to the area of social lore based on direct convivial exchanges, that is the mores of a society, their enforcement, transmission and any accepted processes for their amendment. I think that in contrast to the cognitive area this may be called the practical field of social lore. The word 'practical' should of course refer here to interpersonal practices, while the rules of object-directed practicality are comprised already by cognitive lore.

5. Lastly, we have social lore embodying communication concerning persons. This again comprises a large part of the social heritage constituting a modern civilisation. A massive piece of it is history. Another great section of it is formed by the drama, the epic and the novel, and by all the other literary arts. Religion, so far as it is history and literature falls clearly within this scope. Theology as the analysis of a person, namely God, ought properly to be included as well, but for reasons explained before its inclusion will again be passed
over. "To history and the literary arts we may add political oratory and - in modern times - journalism, films and broadcasts, as further articulate forms cultivating the understanding of men and human affairs. But there are some studies concerning man and society which cannot be either included or excluded here.

At this stage of my argument I am referring to those which this survey is intended to introduce. Take economic theory or social anthropology, as two of a whole group of social sciences; and take any particular psychology, say psycho-analysis, as an instance of the study of man by the methods of natural science. Do these deal with persons as persons? I think not, and would therefore include them among cognitive lore. But this implies that there is an aspect of man which eludes any such studies, and this I cannot try to prove here but must leave open till later.

To sum up then provisionally: I intend to class here all social lore which emanates from our capacity to know persons as persons and to make articulate our understanding of such persons for presentation to fellow-members of our society. This is the study of man in the tradition of humanism. I shall call it the Interpretative section of social lore, remembering once more that this excludes object-directed interpretation which we have already classed within the cognitive area. Interpretation to which I am referring here, should now be clearly distinguishable from this area.

6. The three main classes of social lore - the Cognitive, the Practical and the Interpretative - lend support to three great constituents of our civilisation, which are by no means wholly articulate. Indeed, very much of knowledge, custom and understanding, belonging - in this sequence - to the three main parts of our social heritage, are transmitted by the mere force of practical example. They are largely enfolded in the implications of behaviour and can never be fully expressed by articulate precepts. This follows already from the fact that all articulate
performances of intelligence are based on inarticulate performances. Thus the inarticulate processes by which the elements of speech are taught to succeeding generations transmit the idiom of a civilisation, which largely determines the scope and significance of all its articulately formulated superstructure. The contents of inarticulate tradition are of course vastly enhanced by the growth of a great articulate heritage by which it is sustained and of which - in reverse - it forms the ultimate interpretation. The growth of science for example has given rise to a scientific tradition which, in its turn, supplies the ultimate interpretation of scientific terms, as well as of the methods of scientific observation and scientific inference.

7. We are now at the very threshold of our argument for the necessity of philosophy; but before entering on it we must take stock for a moment of the emotional forces that are aroused by the collectivisation of articulate interpersonal intelligence and which make social lore convincing to each member of a community, just because it is accepted by the others. A common intellectual heritage tends to intensify and helps to organise the conviviality of men and the ensuing consensus of minds forms the indispensable vehicle for the continued transmission of a complex system of articulations, together with their inarticulate accompaniments.

Think of the elementary force of inarticulate conviviality, that of chickens feeding together, of chimpanzees vitalised by each others' companionship; think of the heart-gripping responses between dogs and men, or babes and mothers. These joint forms of living subsist on the most slender means of communication. Vast new opportunities of common life are offered by the articulation of common knowledge, of common usages and of a common literature. Indeed, apart from its material ends, human society seems to be constituted for the mutual participation of individuals in the same cultural heritage. The unsparing
identification of individuals with the fellow members of the same social group strikes the observer as curious if he is himself in no way involved in it. Anthropologists have often wondered how completely the primitive individual identifies himself with fellow members of the same group. What happens to one member of a social unit happens to all and for the deed of one member the rest are held equally responsible. This identification is taken so literally that it excludes the punishment of fratricide or parricide, for in such cases the murderer himself would have to ask for compensation. To avoid the issue, death from such murder is always considered accidental.

The withdrawal of convivial affection by the group to which he so closely belonged has correspondingly severe effects on an individual deprived of it. An individual formally expelled from his group by ritual scolding, may voluntarily languish to death or otherwise commit suicide. This deep rootedness of the individual's vitality in his participation in a group is a result of his adherence to the mores and general outlook of the group. Being moulded by his education to conform with the organized opinion of the group, his self-respect and self-assertion abandon him once these sources of vitality are no longer available. But these blanks and the events associated with them lead him to seek an justification by the group. The group, however, is incapable of repudiating or expelling him.

The adherence of modern Western people to their cultural heritage is no less complete than that of primitive people, but this is less conspicuous to us, for we are ourselves modern Western people and therefore accept our heritage without any sense of conforming to an orthodoxy.

Actually, the enormous range of modern science, law and literature - to take only a few instances of cognitive, practical and interpretative lore - requires for its cultivation and transmission a great number of specialists, each of whom can perform his function only by accepting on the whole unquestioningly the much greater part of our cultural heritage which lies outside his own special field. The existence in our society of a culture highly differentiated, and yet fundamentally coherent, is therefore in itself proof of a general consensus in regard to its general principles, to which we all implicitly adhere.

Until the Revolutions of the twentieth century our acceptance of this consensus had gone virtually unchallenged, but since then our holding of certain distinctive beliefs has become increasingly conspicuous and our support of them has become more explicit in the measure as it could no longer be taken for granted. The attempt of totalitarian dissenters to discredit these beliefs, or at any rate some formulations of these beliefs, has caused angry and angry divisions within our society, leading to irreconcilable conflicts of loyalty in its midst.

To this issue I shall yet return. For the moment I only wish to carry forward the observation that the existence of articulate lore greatly simplifies convivial affections within human society and that this engenders a persuasive passion which seeks to secure the continued adherence of all members of a group to a joint cultural heritage. Social lore cannot exist outside a group of convinced adherents and no conviction is ever held without securing an adherence and relying on the force of persuasive passion.

This completes my survey of intelligent performances and leads up to the point where we shall recognize that the terms in which intelligence was hitherto considered are insufficient, and must be extensively amended, in order that they may enable us to characterize a feat of intelligence as a true feat of intelligence, distinct from a spurious performance or an altogether meaningless behaviour.
I think these terms have failed - and must necessarily fail - to refer adequately to the validity of that which they describe, by the mere fact that they describe it. When I describe something this implies that the things described (in this case the intellectual achievements) are there for me to observe, in the relationship of the It, and are not something in which I existentially participate; not something like my own desire or my own pain in which I am essentially an agent or a sufferer.

This remains true, as I have already hinted in my criticism of the linguistic method, even though I include a description of the emotional colouring which animates the intellectual performance in question and lends it the force of conviction. For so long as I uphold the descriptive attitude of Me detached from an It in which such a persuasive section is included, I remain as its describer, necessarily unaffected by it and cannot express my share in it, if I shared it. Hence, I suggest, descriptive references to feats of intelligence must ignore the main issues raised by any such feat and indeed can never legitimately characterize it as a true feat of intelligence as distinct from a specious performance of an altogether meaningless behaviour.

I shall now try to substantiate this argument and its conclusions by illustrating them with reference to some of the principal sections of social lore.

In principle the argument is applicable to every stage of intellectual performances, from the lowest grade upwards; but great objections are raised if it can be raised whenever in order to such a performance and through raising it on open and public occasions of a philosophic character. Yet I have preferred to postpone this until the present juncture, partly because I wished to complete my preliminary survey of mental operations before embarking on a philosophic critique of the process by which the survey was being conducted, but mainly perhaps because the problems raised by such
a critique become more conspicuous and more difficult to neglect once we begin to appreciate later their bearing on the lower levels, the rather more delicate and academic problems of which will then be recognised as the prototypes of the great questions of life and death, encountered at the upper levels.

10. I shall stress the cognitive area of social lore. I have said that the methods by which information is acquired varies greatly from one society to another and that we find corresponding divergences in regard to what is accepted by different groups as their fund of knowledge. This manner of speaking conceals an ambiguity. For words like 'knowledge', 'information' or 'cognition' have a different meaning to those who believe in the reality of the intellectual achievements referred to by such words than those who do not. Take the example of astrology. It is an ancient and elaborate piece of cognitive lore, which originated in Assyria about the third century B.C. and has been since widely upheld as valid within the regions surrounding the Mediterranean for nearly 2000 years. To believers in astrology, it represents the art of predicting a person's lifelong destiny from the position of the stars at the moment of his birth. This would form a tremendous intellectual achievement, rather similar to that claimed by some schools of psycho-analysis which make predictions of a similar range - at least in retrospect - from the pre-natal experiences, the natal shock or the earliest infantile conflicts of a person. To me on the contrary, astrology signifies merely an outmoded superstition void of any intellectual achievement. It appears therefore that if the casting of horoscopes is described as a cognitive act, we are leaving the question open whether the act...
This ambiguity can be strictly avoided only if people who believe in astrology will use a different language from those who don't. Only astrologers should speak of astrology and horoscopes, as I speak of this blackboard or of the multiplication table, whereas I should be barred from using the same terms as they do and should speak instead of 'astrology' and 'horoscopes' in quotation marks.

Similarly, only the Christian believer should speak of miracles in referring to supernatural events alleged by the Gospels, while non-Christians should always use the word 'miracles' in quotation marks when referring to the same topic. In general, every time we speak of knowledge, information or cognition, we should have to make it clear whether we really mean knowledge, information, cognition, etc., or merely 'knowledge,' 'information,' 'cognition' in quotation marks.

Let me illustrate the point more particularly in respect to science. When we speak of a scientific discovery, we mean something different from a false claim to a discovery. It is impossible to write a history of science without distinguishing between the two. We do not speak of the discovery of radioactivity by Röntgen or of the discovery of the N-rays by Becquerel. But, at any rate, unless we believe that these things exist, Soviet scientists are logically correct in speaking of the discovery of vegetative hybridization by Mishurin and Lysenko, but no Western geneticist refers to the observations in question as discoveries. Similarly, we do not speak of the invention of a machine of perpetual motion by the Marquis of Worcester in 1663, when in his Century of Invention he gave a detailed description of his construction of such a machine in the form of a wheel of 14 feet in diameter, with 40 weights of 50 pounds attached to its rim. For we do not believe that the
apiece attached to its rim. For we do not believe that the machine worked. Until it was decided whether hypnosis does work or not, it was also undecided whether anyone could be credited with its discovery.

If any writer tried to avoid the necessity of taking a stand in respect to the truth or falsehood of discoveries, by writing a history of scientific allegations or of alleged science, he would (while undertaking an impossible task) certainly not produce a history of science. Any reference to science, technology, mathematics, in the proper sense of these terms should imply that what is so designated is believed to be valid by him who thus designates it. Such designation implies the act of underwriting that which is designated and is charged with an emotional participation in its designation. Any usage which leaves this point unclear is ambiguous; any usage which implies the possibility of an impersonal reference to an intellectual achievement like science or mathematics is deceptive and in fact contradicts its true import, which is to commit the speaker to acceptance of that which he is describing as science, etc.

11. It appears then that the terms in which I have hitherto described cognitive lore must be amended so as to make it clear whether they are meant to designate true knowledge or merely alleged knowledge, hypothetically falsely alleged. This discrimination does not necessarily raise the great philosophic problems of epistemology. It might be attempted within the scope of cognitive performances of the same kind which we have listed in our survey. A journalist checking up on a rumour, or a judge deciding what testimony should be accepted in evidence, tries to distinguish between knowledge and falsely alleged knowledge. So does a textbook writer, critically sifting published papers. We might conceivably subject in a similar manner each item of alleged science, technology, mathematics etc. to a new scrutiny and include in our survey only those which stand the test of such critical reconsideration. We
might then conclude by such procedure that Milliken's determination
of the electron's charge is true while Ehrenhaft's observation of
smaller charges which he attributed to a 'sub-electron' is false,
and then class the former as a scientific measurement and the
latter as an unscientific allegation. The term 'science' would
then be taken to designate a particular group of true allegations,
each of which we have verified separately.

But this would actually be impracticable and, even if practicable
would be insufficient. We cannot talk about science without
referring to innumerable allegations of which we have no detailed
knowledge and about the validity of which we could never venture
to form an opinion of our own. To limit ourselves to such knowledge
would be practically to ignore science as a body of systematic
knowledge. And this would still remain true in an important sense
if by a superhuman feat of industry and intelligence we could
actually check up on every single claim of science. For it would
give us no opportunity to examine science as a whole. We could
not analyse the scientific method nor try to justify our belief
in its validity or define the range of its bearing. We could not
even verify whether there is any justification in collecting a
particular set of true statements under the common heading of
'science'. (i.e. e.g. a collection of engine numbers, part of science?)

Now it could be argued that these questions are unnecessary.
That scientists carry on their researches without arguing about
the methods of science and have no use for the services of philos-
ophers who would offer their advice in the matter. This would be
untrue in fact for the discoveries of modern physics are known to
have received important stimulus from the philosophic phenomenalism
of the late 19th century. The outstanding example of this was
Einstein's theory of relativity which had its roots in Mach's
philosophic critique of Newtonian mechanics. Heisenberg's
discovery of quantum mechanics in 1924 was guided by the same
philosophic assumptions, which in 1928 were formulated as
'Operationalism' by P.W. Bridgman. In other instances Mach's
phenomenalism had an adverse effect on the progress of science, as it seriously discouraged atomistic speculations and retarded the recognition of the kinetic theory of gases; but even in this is proved to be relevant to the work of the scientist. A major development of contemporaneous mathematics took its origin from a philosophic temper closely akin to phenomenalism. In 1900 David Hilbert undertook to reduce mathematics altogether to the practice of operating certain symbols according to conventional rules. Though this programme was eventually defeated, its pursuit and the response which it evoked has made contributions to mathematics for almost half a century. The development of psychology in the 20th century has been decisively affected by the psychologists' conception of science. Of this there is emphatic testimony in the works of Freud, Pavlov, Clark L. Hull and indeed throughout modern psychological literature. Moreover, the claims which the study of man by psychology or social anthropology may make in view of its conception of its own scope may conflict with the claims of other references to man and society, in literature, history or jurisprudence. I have mentioned points of such conflicts before.

In my survey of social lore I have included pictorial art within the cognitive area, placing it next to mathematics, within the interpretative section of object-directed intelligence. It is curious how deeply the progress of painting has been guided, or at any rate supported, by changing views about the function of painting. Ever since 1860 when the Impressionists opened their campaign, the painters of successive schools have argued as much as they have painted, and each held its own theory of painting. In the first half of this century the most influential programme was similar to that which Hilbert gave about the same time to mathematics. It was the view of the Fauves which regarded a picture as an array of two dimensional coloured patches which had to be arranged in a significant pattern regardless of their representative meaning. This movement had its parallel also in poetry and literary criticism.
which were both animated by the view that a literary text was essentially a pattern of words. The person and work of I.A. Richards links this theory of literature conspicuously to the intention fostered at the time by formal logic of reducing all science and indeed all mental activities to strictly formalised operations.

12. These instances in which the validity of science as a whole as well as that of other object-directed intellectual processes, was re-assessed and these processes were re-directed accordingly, are but lesser examples of the influence exercised by philosophic self-consciousness on the entire range of mental activities. In our own time these influences have culminated in a sharp conflict, roughly corresponding to the political division between East and West, of different philosophies defining differently the validity of science, law, literature and indeed of all manner of cognitive, practical and interpretative lore.

Western science is based on the assumption of its own universality; we are shocked if the Soviet Government affirms on the contrary, that all science is class science and rejects on these as bourgeois science much of what is accepted as science in the West. This attack calls in question the continued existence of science as understood in the West and challenges the West to affirm the grounds on which it would uphold its conception of science. As we value our scientific life we must henceforth defend it philosophically.

Other, perhaps even more vital philosophic issues are forced upon us in the great practical fields of law and government. We may again trace these back to problems raised originally in the course of theoretical studies. Even as writers about science cannot avoid considering the grounds on which they distinguish between science and allegations falsely claiming scientific recognition, so writers on law will be unable to consider their subject as a whole without trying to characterise it, by distinguishing in the first place between what are lawful and what unlawful
commands. All jurisprudence must make affirmations of what is and what is not the law, and it could avoid this only by not writing about law as having force of law, which would not be law. Hence the long-standing discussions on the nature of right law which has thrown up a number of rival definitions of it. While these divergent conceptions of the law have necessarily affected the direction in which the development of the law was guided by the writings of jurists and the interpretative tendencies which they induced in the law courts, no far-reaching conflicts were raised by these philosophic differences. Adherents of the "command theory" co-operated smoothly with believers in the reality of natural law, and a judge like Jerome Franck who in his writings tended towards a purely empirical conception of legal behaviour, carried on his judicial functions to the universal respect of a profession predominantly professing an ideal of law which he had condemned as empty claptrap. But issues of legal philosophy become vital when they embody a political conflict, as when the Common Lawyers of the 17th century upheld against the Crown the theory that the King was under the law and could not even sit in a court administering the law in his name; or when at Nuremberg, contrary to all precedent, the leaders of a defeated power were brought to trial and sentenced to prison by the victors, on the charge of launching an aggressive war; or again when in 1947 Kurt Tillessen, one of the men who murdered Rathenau in 1923, was acquitted by a German court on the grounds that the amnesty which Hitler had granted to such criminals was legally valid. For more sweeping, however, and indeed all-embracing are again the philosophic conflicts which divide totalitarianism from the Western world. The jurisprudence of Fascism and Communism which denies any independent status to the law, forces us to take up seriously the philosophic defence of law. When a great and heavily armed power supported by fanatical followers all over the world, fosters and foments a bitter contempt for our rule of law; denouncing it as a mere instrument of force used for keeping
the workers in submission, and when the utmost sacrifices may be required to defend our legal order from destruction by such a power, then it seems indispensable that we should have some way of justifying our adherence to it against such shattering criticism.

13. Yet the doctrines that all science is class-science and that law is but the will of the stronger are but the derivatives of a deeper philosophic conviction concerning the nature of man and society. The fundamental division between men today lies in the discrepancy of their beliefs concerning the real forces that move men in public affairs. Communists and even Fascists are addicted to violence primarily not from cruelty or lust for power, but from love of truth and contempt for deceit. Man has an irresistible craving to grasp something on which he can firmly rely. He must have some indisputable terms in which he can understand what is happening to him and plan his future actions. He demands a steady framework within which to build his hopes, grant his loyalty and mark down his enemy. Once he has become firmly convinced, be it by upbringing or conversion, that man is inescapably subject to the drives of self interest, he will entrust himself to these explanatory terms with every fibre of his being. His love of truth will then express itself in denying that a desire for truth can be a mainspring of human action. His moral sentiments will be expressed in a hatred of all moral sentiments, as sheer hypocrisy in the exploiter and enfolding emotionalism in the exploited. The more intense his passion for truth and justice, the more virulently will he deplore any conception of human affairs which would rely on other people's passion for truth and justice. Hence such theories as that all science is class science and that all law mere violence, and hence also the practice of conducting scientific discussions in terms of political invective and of using fictitious legal proceedings to destroy persons of whose loyalty the Government is doubtful. Within this framework, history also becomes "a weapon in the struggle of classes" and must be written in accordance to this requirement. Indeed, once the appetitive interpretation of man
in public affairs is firmly accepted as the basic reality, an
unceasing struggle must ensue for a complete assimilation of all
actions of any social significance to this framework.

The philosophic challenge of our time thus spreads over our
entire horizon and deepens to the utmost grounds of reality.
There is not an idiom of our cultural heritage that we can
pronounce today without encountering sharp-fanged philosophic objections. Here lies a new necessity of
philosophy to which I shall try to respond in these pages.

I shall not enquire here why such philosophic issues
were raised so decisively in our particular age. But I want to
reconsider briefly their position in respect to my previous
survey of intellectual achievement. Animals can solve problems
of the kind which on a higher level belong to science, technology
and geometry; but they are inarticulate. By an articulate
affirmation a person emotionally identifies himself with the
validity of that which is affirmed. This produces a new
situation. Once we have accepted spoken or written texts, maps,
calculations, poems, pieces of music, laws, prescriptions etc.,
which we believe to be true, valid, binding or in any way well
established, a curious new object has come into existence which
speaks with the voice of our conviction and yet can be picked
up and held up for examination to find out how it works.
Articulation makes it possible and eventually inevitable that we
should critically reflect on the acts of our intelligence and
that is philosophy.

I agree therefore with the linguistic school in attributing
all our philosophic problems to the use of language and even share
up to a point their hopes of disentangling these discords by
eradicating some mystifying usages. But in view of the fact
revealed by this survey, that the articulate must always remain
rooted in the inarticulate, I should not expect my true
philosophy to claim more than to be consistent with the ultimately
unspecifiable nature of its own meaning.