

**The Poetics of Discovery:  
Literature and the Tacit Dimension**

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**I. Introduction:  
Getting the News from Poems**

It is difficult  
to get the news from poems  
yet men die miserably every day  
for lack  
of what is found there.<sup>1</sup>

Like all the literary arts, poetry is difficult, as these lines from poet William Carlos Williams attest. Motivated to search for fundamental truths, or to evade some deathly misery of everyday life, serious readers struggle perennially to get what "news" they can from poems and other works of literature. The best of such news comes from works that look beyond the known, offering insight—by the use of literary forms like metaphor, symbol, and narrative point of view—into the background or "tacit dimension" that underlies all experience. By bringing the tacit (unspoken) dimension of experience to light, the literary text becomes a catalyst by which the reader's capacities for imagination and intuition are released, and so bring new perception of order and meaning to his experience.

Paradoxically, the philosophy of Michael Polanyi—coming as it does from his studies of scientific discovery—affords extraordinary means to answer questions like those implied by Williams: what kind of "news" is offered by poems and other literary works? and what is involved in "getting" it? One key is the central idea in Polanyi's account of discovery: *the tacit dimension of knowing*. In this account, discovery happens when the mind, starting from immersion in an established field of knowledge, and following a hunch or premonition that there is more to be known, reaches into its own tacit dimension, and finds in undercurrents of the thought-stream, the motivation to explore the unknown. "Look at the unknown" writes Polanyi, encouraging his own readers to take such an imaginative leap—not just from one set of facts to another, but from one framework of understanding to another. "*Look at the known data, not in themselves,*

rather as clues to the unknown; as pointers to it and parts of it."<sup>2</sup> The art of *looking at the "unknown"* to discover hidden order in the phenomena of nature and experience is the art of tacit knowing.

The principles of tacit knowing offer compelling insight into the way the language of literature delivers its potentially life-quickenening "news"—esp. about such fundamental issues as *personal identity, relationships* (with nature or one's fellow humans), the meaning of *meaning*, and *death*. By presenting an articulate set of symbolic "clues," the literary text gives a reader unique access to the tacit dimension of knowing, leading her to discover "intrinsic or existential meaning" (*PK* 58, 65) not only in the text, but in the reader's own life-world. Some literary works, especially those that deal with "the ontological aspect of tacit knowing"<sup>3</sup> also give the reader insight into the fundamental assumptions governing the human reality, including language-use, at any given historical moment. Literature serves to educate the sensibility to perceive higher-level potentials for order in experience. Through its artistic use of forms like metaphor and narrative point of view, literature can also be catalytic in moving the reader from one framework of understanding, or set of fundamental assumptions, to another.

A powerful underlying motive of Polanyi's philosophy is to alert readers to the dangers and limitations imposed on the modern world by the conceptual framework he calls "objectivism," and to re-orient thought to a post-critical framework that offers access to the tacit dimension of knowing. The argument of this paper is that reading certain literary texts from the standpoint of tacit knowing enables the reader to become an agent in this fundamental reorientation of thought. Learning to read literary texts through the lens of tacit knowing involves a move from the assumptions of objectivism to a new framework, one that recognizes the validity of the tacit dimension and makes it possible to act from its basis. Applying the theory of tacit knowing to Leo Tolstoy's ingenious use of narrative point of view in his archetypal tale of death and spiritual awakening, ***The Death of Ivan Ilych***, we'll explore how the theory can help readers get from literary discourse more of the *news* Williams speaks of. The paper will also explore the premise that poetic metaphor, in this story and texts by Wallace Stevens and others, leads the reader along a path resembling (in Polanyi's terms) that of the "creative scientist." Along this path one moves through the stages Polanyi calls *indwelling, breaking out of an accepted framework of thought, and discovery* (*PK* 195-202).

The scientist begins the search for new kinds of order in nature by "dwelling in" the materials of investigation, living in anticipation that some new coherences among the phenomena will disclose themselves. In a parallel sense, inquiry in the realm of literature may begin with contemplative reading. This, I will argue, is its own form of indwelling. In peak moments of creativity in science, as in literature, "contemplation" (according to Polanyi) moves the searcher to the experience of "breaking out" of an accepted framework of understanding, and entering a newly emerging framework. The game-changing discoveries of Copernicus and Einstein both ushered into their fields radically new conceptual frameworks.

As articulated by Polanyi, profound discoveries like these entail the dismantling of an outmoded framework in order to make room for new understanding. A discovery of new order, like the heliocentric system in astronomy or relativity in physics, requires complete absorption in (or indwelling) the known to discover truths that can no longer be accounted for by known theory. The rational and empirical methods of normal science may explain much about the results of such discoveries, but are inadequate, in Polanyi's view, to explain the process of discovery itself. In the cases of Copernicus and Einstein, discovery was not simply a matter of finding new information, but of creating a new framework that would make genuinely new understanding possible. In each case the emergence of a new framework is signaled by new definitions of words. After Copernicus, "earth" is no longer a fixed point in space; and after Einstein, Planck, and others, "matter" is equated with energy. It's no longer the fixed Cartesian "substance" accepted as fact within the framework of nineteenth-century positivism, no longer an object in the mechanistic system of objectivism.

A "framework" in Polanyi's vocabulary is the fundamental structure of beliefs, ideas, or assumptions available to a searcher to begin her search. Linguistic and semantic aspects of a given framework establish rules for what can be said or not said, while many of these rules remain in the background, unstated; and "interpretative frameworks" (*PK* 93, and *passim*) establish limits as to how language may be interpreted. Because he believed its assumptions led to an incorrect account of the process of discovery in science, Polanyi's central motive in *Personal Knowledge* and other books was to deconstruct the underlying framework of objectivism. In its imperial reach, objectivism had set life-denying boundaries to language and thought, by confining inquiry to calculative thinking, and aggressively denying validity to contemplative thinking which seeks to look beyond the scope of calculation.<sup>4</sup>

Polanyi's philosophy points a way to dislodge objectivism from its dominance in the modern world, and to replace it with a new (as yet unnamed) framework capable of grappling with the non-objective aspects of reality: such "invisible" things as consciousness, passion, and tacit knowing. Though forced into eclipse by the dominance of objectivism in the modern world, the tacit dimension is evident perennially in literature, the arts, and religion. It is seen also, ironically, in the work of creative scientists engaged in discovery. Objectivism is a social construction based on the reductive view that reality consists entirely of *objects* in mechanistic interactions with other objects. In extreme forms of objectivist orthodoxy, such as radical behaviorism and logical positivism, all testimony regarding non-objective phenomena like consciousness or soul is ruled unintelligible. To counter the tyranny of the objectivist framework, Polanyi argues that discovery in science occurs not by following linear or pre-existing logical steps, but by the scientist's indwelling what is known in his field, attaining "heuristic vision," and letting the tacit energy of vision direct him to calculations or other moves that may fail, but may also lead to truth. By the searcher's absorbed attention to particulars in her field of study, the mind performs acts of creative synthesis, undergoing a process like *gestalt-formation*

(*PK* 55-58, and *passim*). With success these culminate in theoretical models, like those of Copernicus and Einstein, with potentially inexhaustible applications.

Metaphor works by a similar process. It demands the same extraordinary attention, but typically directed to an ordinary word-image. The word-image signifies a known concrete thing or situation. This in turn refers to something beyond itself. Starting by indwelling the elements of literature (word-images that form metaphor, plot, character, and point of view) the reader discerns in the text a means of breaking out of inert habits of thought. Its artistic elements combine to form clues to new order in the human reality. What's discovered is not objective facts like those found in science, but coherences previously unknown in the reader's life-world—e.g. in human identity, in mental or spiritual awakenings, even in the seeming anomaly of death. While the hidden order in nature unveiled by the scientist is subject to "verification" by other scientists, the coherences in experience disclosed in the arts are justified by what Polanyi calls "validation" (*PK* 202).

To the degree the individual *gets* the *news* from literature, she gains *personal knowledge*, which can be shared and so validated intersubjectively by mentors or peers. The formal properties of literary art involve an aesthetic transmission of coherence to the life of the reader. Like doing heuristic science, reading literature is a creative process. Guided by the text, reading becomes a search motivated by fiduciary commitment, not to a preconceived idea, but to *getting the news*.<sup>5</sup> Though often less than fully explicit, the mark of success in the search is discovery of new existential meanings. These may involve new subjective coherences in the reader's life (e.g. a leap in emotional intelligence or mental clarity, movement into a contemplative state, or such phenomena as "purification of the motive/In the ground of our beseeching,"<sup>6</sup> in the words of T.S. Eliot).

In his 1942 essay "The Music of Poetry," Eliot says "the poet is occupied with frontiers of consciousness, beyond which words fail, though meanings still exist."<sup>7</sup> Occupying this frontier zone in consciousness is a writer's way of accessing the tacit dimension of knowing, sensing through the "power of anticipation" (*PK*, 103) or premonition that something new is waiting to be discovered. For the writer this entails escaping trivial and hackneyed language that holds one to the known, and striking out for the territory—an unknown spiritual or intellectual topography. In a literary text there's a point at which the "literal" (explicit) meanings of words "fail," a signifier points only to an empty or unreal signified. But applying the phenomenology of tacit knowing to literature, reading (like writing) becomes essentially experimental, and like any experiment may lead to failure. It begins by indwelling the symbols in the text, in expectation that new order will disclose itself not only in the text but in the experience of the reader. One of the denotations of Eliot's word "occupy" is to "dwell in or reside." So as the vehicle of a metaphor, Eliot's "occupy" has much the same tenor (tacit significance) as Polanyi's "indwell." The common implication of both terms in their respective contexts is becoming fully engaged in contemplation of the unknown, in the experience of

anticipation that discovery may lie ahead. The reader willing to follow the text into this territory may find, with "a little grace," means of answering fundamental questions regarding the depth dimensions of existence.<sup>8</sup>

As a dancer enters and becomes immersed in the dance, the conscious listener enters into a musical performance. If one's self-abandonment is sufficient in engaging with the work of art, she in a sense becomes one with the work. She finds the means through this full engagement to leap across the logical gap established by the objectivist framework between subject and object. Like the performing musician, for the listener, writes Eliot in *Four Quartets*, the music may be

heard so deeply  
That it is not heard at all, but you are the music  
While the music lasts.<sup>9</sup>

If the poet is occupied with frontiers of consciousness, where words fail but "meanings still exist," the text still makes the opportunity available to the reader to "occupy" the same zone of meaning by "indwelling" the words of poetry. Eliot's lines implicitly claim that it is possible to surrender (in Polanyi's terms) one's "lower self" in a "comprehensive conversion" to a "higher self" (*PK* 318). The composer, having gone through the highest levels of engagement with ideas for a piece, leaves a record of the intensity and formal properties of this engagement in the abstract symbols of the musical score. This gives both performer and listener the opportunity to recreate in their own experience the high intensity of the composer's engagement with the musical ideas that made the work possible.

By analogy, in literature, the poet leaves a record of her creative engagement with words and meanings in the form of a finished text. Readers then perform at different levels. The actor performs by oral recitation, but silent reading is also virtual performing, demanding that we go beyond decoding the denotative meanings of words and syntax, and engage fully with their semantic deep-structures. The theory of tacit knowing enables us to see more of what's actually happening (or may happen) in reading a text. The path of discovery leads the searcher to activate the tacit energies of "heuristic vision," "dynamic intuition," and "creative imagination."<sup>10</sup> When these elements of tacit knowing take precedence over the consciousness of the scientist, she is on a path of discovery. The same elements of the process of knowing are at work in understanding literary texts, and have similar potentials for discovery in the existential domain .

From a writer's standpoint, novelist Joseph Conrad implicitly makes a case for the importance of the tacit dimension in the act of reading. "My task which I am trying to achieve is, by the power of the written word, to make you hear, to make you feel—it is, before all, to make you see. That—and no more, and it is everything. If I succeed, you shall find there [that is, discover] according to your deserts: encouragement, consolation, fear, charm—all you demand; and, perhaps, also that glimpse of truth for which you have forgotten to ask."<sup>11</sup> From a post-critical standpoint, our adherence to objectivist standards, demanding that

we maintain a distance from things, to see them objectively, inhibits sense experience. How can reading place a person where he or she can receive this power of the written word to enhance his powers of hearing, feeling, seeing? The key in reading literary texts is to allow the tacit dimension to take precedence over the more explicit aspects of knowing. By doing so, we recognize in the text something more than representational language, *re-presenting* information already known or knowable in the objective realm. The way of tacit knowing is to see the text as a set of clues that guide us to see, hear, and feel more than what we're accustomed to.

## II. "The Highest Candle":

### Wallace Stevens and the Power of Metaphor

In one of his small masterpieces, enigmatically titled "Final Soliloquy of the Interior Paramour," Wallace Stevens writes:

Light the first light of evening, as in a room  
 In which we rest and, for small reason, think  
 The world imagined is the ultimate good.

This is, therefore, the intensest rendezvous.  
 It is in that thought that we collect ourselves,  
 Out of all the indifferences, into one thing:

Within a single thing, a single shawl  
 Wrapped tightly round us, since we are poor, a warmth,  
 A light, a power, the miraculous influence.

Here, now, we forget each other and ourselves.  
 We feel the obscurity of an order, a whole,  
 A knowledge, that which arranged the rendezvous,

Within its vital boundary, in the mind.  
 We say God and the imagination are one . . .  
 How high that highest candle lights the dark.

Out of this same light, out of the central mind,  
 We make a dwelling in the evening air,  
 In which being there together is enough.<sup>12</sup>

The poem is ostensibly a love song, ironically a paramour's soliloquy, seeking within his own "interior" a comprehension of "the ultimate good." Powerfully but obliquely the text first poses the problem to

the reader's imagination, then guides us in a path to discovery of this "comprehensive entity" (*TD* 34) Stevens calls "ultimate good." We see the intimation of discovery in the poem's testament to a feeling, which we're invited to share with the speaker, of "an order, a whole,/A knowledge," growing out of his experience. "What it is that we know by understanding a comprehensive entity, makes an *ontological* reference to it" writes Polanyi (*TD* 32). In its metaphors and in its reference to the ultimate, the poem addresses the problem of being itself, touching "the ontological aspect of tacit knowing."

For Polanyi, "the kind of comprehensive entities exemplified by skillful human performances are real things; as real as cobblestones and, in view of their far greater independence and power, much more real"—possessing "a deeper reality" (*TD* 32-33). The writing of the poem is such a "skillful performance," and our reading is or may also be a skillful performance, like that of a performer playing a Schubert sonata, a musical text that she "gets" by indwelling the particulars of the score. The language of the text implicitly invites the reader to engage with "the two terms of tacit knowing" which will be "seen as two levels of reality"—"the proximal" (particulars in the form of concrete words, many of them the *vehicles* in metaphors) and "the distal," which is their "comprehensive meaning" (*TD* 34). The form of tacit knowing required to pose the problem of the ultimate good involves a "correspondence between the structure of comprehension and the structure of the comprehensive entity [the work of art] which is its object" (*TD* 33-34). By *performing* the work, whether in consciousness or in oral delivery, the reader in effect creates just such a correspondence. The comprehensive entity expressed here as "the world imagined" raises for the reader the question of how to activate the quality and reach of imagination to encounter this "ultimate good."

The path is to "light first light of evening" which the metaphors do in our minds, drawing us into the semantic space in which words name an objective situation ("in a room"), where we "rest" and "think," before taking us to a higher level of reality, the distal comprehensive meaning of the poem. The "light" (as both noun and verb) carries us to something like the inner sensation of Stevens's ultimate "world imagined." To move its reader in this direction the poem offers a set of virtual instructions in meditative thinking, showing us how to leap the logical gap from our ordinary temporal selfhood to a new framework, from which we learn to read the signs of the ultimate good.

In his contact ("rendezvous") with the ultimate, as if articulating the principle of "single pointed attention," common to traditional schools of meditation, the speaker says, "It is in that thought that we collect ourselves,/Out of all the indifferences, into one thing." To whom do all the second-person pronouns refer? Since there is no explicit character other than the speaker, the pronouns (we, us, ourselves) virtually reach out to the reader—to come into the room and join in the transcendent experience described. The language of the poem makes us feel the speaker's meditative state through concrete images like "a single shawl/ Wrapped tightly round us, since we are poor." From these particulars the speaker and his interior lover

realize "a warmth,/A light, a power, the miraculous influence." As the shawl is wrapped tightly to bring them warmth, the reader too is drawn into this warmth and its influence, by the power of poetic discourse.

The vehicle of the metaphor "light," at first a very objective "first light of evening," carries us to the tacit level of meaning: "light" which is also a "power" within us. In seeing this light, within the ambience of the poem, the reader is guided into an experience of self-surrender, where, we're told, "we forget each other and ourselves." By releasing a conventional sense of identity, we contact the tacit dimension of consciousness: "We feel the obscurity of an order, a whole,/A knowledge, that which arranged the rendezvous,/Within its vital boundary, in the mind." Merging with power, this second reference to "light" points to a referent that is far less explicit than the first light of evening (ostensibly a lamp in a room). Within a few lines the tenor of the metaphor "light" goes through more transformations, to "a light" that is the "highest candle" that "lights the dark," and finally the "same light" that is "the central mind." By this progression of meanings the poem initiates us into "a knowledge" of what this "ultimate" is, showing us that we "*know more than we can tell*" (in Polanyi's phrase, *TD* 4).

In the process of enlightenment described in the poem "we" are drawn into the "miraculous influence" of poetic discourse, opening our awareness of the tacit dimension of language, whereby we "make a dwelling in the evening air/In which being there together is enough." Together with whom? The poem leaves us with this ambiguity, which only impels further inquiry into the tacit dimension of language. Right where we are in everyday experience we discover a new "wholeness," the comprehensive entity that is our oneness with "the central mind," expressed more emphatically by the line "We say God and the imagination are one." The text does not tell us the news but gives us in poetic discourse clues to discover for ourselves an experience of transcendent light that can't be expressed in declarative or propositional form. The news expressed here is the poet's discovery that the "God" conceived by religion as a supernatural being, is "one" with the natural power within us called "imagination."

The semantic structure of metaphor involves the reader in what Polanyi and Prosch call acts of "integration," in which the elements (signifier and signified, vehicle and tenor) are integrated in the reader's mind. Metaphors designed primarily to give *information* (e.g. "a weak link") are called "indications," in which the reader performs "self-centered" integrations. But literary metaphors, designed to incite the reader's participation in the process of meaning-making, are examples in Polanyian terms of "self-giving integrations." Representational language leads the reader only to "self-centered integrations."<sup>13</sup> Interpreting poetic language as representational is a mistake, retaining one's center of gravity in a Cartesian self, so the activity of knowing remains at a distance from its object. In this "I-It" relation to the text, the self remains in its ego-centric shell. But when approaching the text from the standpoint of tacit knowing we see our interaction with it as a holistic occasion of experience, forming an "I-Thou" relation to it. Its metaphors and other semantic

elements converge to make an occasion for "self-giving integration" (*M* 74-75) of otherwise unformed or disparate phenomena of experience. Learning how to distinguish denotative language from poetic discourse in the experience of reading trains the mind to leap the logical gap between self-centered and self-giving integrations. But in a larger context it is training in how to step out of the objectivist framework, and move into a new framework of understanding where the principles of tacit knowing come naturally into play.

In *The Tacit Dimension* Polanyi explains, "aesthetic appreciation" (*TD* 17)—a first step in getting the news from poetic metaphor—is "a striking form of tacit knowing as applied to the understanding of man and works of art." It involves "an entering into a work of art and thus dwelling in the mind of its creator" (*TD* 17). It is an act of self-giving integration of the reader's self with the poem as a work of art, entering into its frame of reference, and so dissolving some of the prejudice instilled in us by living within the objectivist framework. As Polanyi and Prosch suggest in *Meaning*, the metaphor is a model of how tacit knowing works, as a movement *from* a particular word-image, *to* the tacit dimension where meanings (referents) are open-ended and so require our participation in order to become meaningful. Poetry invites the reader into the experience of the tacit dimension. When reading poetry becomes striving toward "self-giving integration," like Stevens's paramour "we forget each other and ourselves" and so make our "integration" with a larger whole possible. In the reader's feeling "the obscurity of an order, a whole," its very obscurity is a sign that we are touching the tacit dimension, and so opening possibilities for new existential discovery.

Literary metaphor is a clue to "breaking out" of the operative systems of objectivist logic that sustain conventional meanings and reasoning about the known (*PK* 195-202). Discovery is not just a matter of finding new information, but involves leaping across the "logical gap" that separates one framework of thought from a newly emerging framework. Poetry like that of Stevens or Eliot is a highly crafted discipline designed to look for existential meanings, but also to offer clues to a new framework of understanding, a new world imagined. It is presented to readers as an opportunity, like that offered by master to apprentice, to "get the feel of the master's skill" (*TD* 30). By engaging in the discipline of interpreting the poem by searching for the tacit dimension of language, we enter a virtual apprenticeship to the poet as master of tacit knowing.

We fully understand a phenomenon only "by dwelling in it," writes Polanyi,

and this indwelling can be consciously experienced. Astronomic observations are made by dwelling in astronomic theory, and it is this internal enjoyment of astronomy which makes the astronomer interested in the stars. This is how scientific value is *contemplated from within*. But *awareness of this joy* is dimmed when the formulae of astronomy are used in a routine manner. (*PK* 195, my italics)

Similarly the joy of contemplating metaphoric language like Stevens's "highest candle [that] lights the dark" may be dimmed by retreating to an abstract distance from it—objectifying it, so to speak, in analysis. But just

as the scientist moves toward discovery of previously undetected coherences in nature by "contemplative experience" or "indwelling"—experiencing known natural facts "from within" the things themselves—not from a distance, as required by objectivist standards—the epistemology of tacit knowing shows us how to "interiorize" (*TD* 30) the language of poetry to detect the tacit dimension in literary metaphor, and so begin the process of existential discovery.

### III. Dissolving the Screen:

#### Tolstoy and the Way of Contemplation

The main character in Leo Tolstoy's novella *The Death of Ivan Ilych*, a middle-aged lawyer and judge in nineteenth-century Russia, is portrayed as gradually sinking into catastrophic illness, suffering, and as we're told on the first page, death. After a prologue in chapter 1, in which we learn that Ivan has died, the story of his life begins with the line, "Ivan Ilych's life had been most simple and most ordinary and therefore most terrible."<sup>14</sup> As the narrative unfolds we see that Ivan tends to act strictly "in the fulfillment of what he considered to be his duty: and he considered his duty to be what was so considered by those in authority" (105). He was "capable of separating his official duties from his private life" and

acquired a method of eliminating all considerations irrelevant to the legal aspect of [any] case, and reducing even the most complicated case to a form in which it would be presented on paper only in its externals, . . . observing every prescribed formality. (105)

Ivan's ability to reduce his professional life to externals and prescribed formality resembles his life at home, where he and his wife lived in an "ocean of veiled hostility which showed itself in their aloofness from one another." But "on the whole his life ran its course as he believed life should do: easily, pleasantly, and decorously." At work, "the thing was to exclude everything fresh and vital, . . . to admit only official relations with people, and then only on official grounds" (117). By habit he could "separate his real life from the official side of affairs and not mix the two" (118). And

the pleasure that beamed like a light above everything else was to sit down to bridge with good players, . . . to play a clever and serious game (when the cards allowed it) and then to have supper and drink a glass of wine. (119)

All this simple ordinariness is somehow "most terrible" in the judgment of the narrator. When he gets ill, incapacitated and in increasing pain, Ivan is forced gradually into solitude and mental darkness. And the narrator moves from a point of view of pure objectivity into an interior perspective.

Through the artistic handling of narrative point of view the reader is guided by the text to experience a virtual metamorphosis. When Ivan's colleagues at the Law Courts are reading in the *Gazette* that Ivan has just died, the "mere fact" of his death arouses "as usual" in them the "complacent feeling" that "it is he who is dead and not I" (96). The reader too identifies, perhaps subconsciously, with this "usual" feeling, placing

death in a category objective to his own experience. But as the text jumps back in time, the narrative point of view begins to move away from externals, to disclose the interior dimensions of Ivan's life. It's designed to make us see his life "from within," less by description than by making us "see" for ourselves, by identifying more and more intimately with Ivan's struggle to escape suffering and death. Unlike ordinary discourse that typically seeks to "tell" its reader things about objective reality, literary discourse in the hands of a master like Tolstoy seeks instead to create a virtual synapse, or intersection-point between the consciousness of the reader and the way a character feels and sees his own predicament. The aesthetic design of his great text is to form a dynamic interface with the reader, by its ingenious use of narrative point of view guiding us to see, affectively more than cognitively, what his main character is experiencing.

In great fiction, there are "elements of indeterminacy," as literary theorist Wolfgang Iser puts it, that enable the text to "communicate" with the reader, in the sense that they induce him to participate . . . [in the] comprehension of the work's intention. . . . [The] relative indeterminacy of a text [then] allows a spectrum of actualizations.<sup>15</sup>

By the skilled use of point of view a work of fiction leads the reader to see something of this spectrum of possible actualizations in experience, and to comprehend its intention. When from reading the text we hear, feel, and see more of the human reality than ordinary perception can comprehend, we're actualizing some part of the author's intent, manifesting itself as the reader's existential discovery. Like many great works of literature Tolstoy's story accomplishes this by disclosing processes occurring in the tacit dimension of his main character's consciousness. In early stages the work draws us from Ivan's (and his colleagues') superficial objectivity into a state of moral indeterminacy. "Left alone, Ivan Ilych groaned not so much with pain, terrible though that was, as from mental anguish" (140). In Ivan's desperate uncertainty about the cause of his illness, and later in his deep questioning of the correctness of his life-long preoccupation with "externals" and "prescribed formality," the author makes us sense what moral indeterminacy feels like.

The narrative carries the reader into the corrosive emotional interior of Ivan's questioning of all the standards by which he had lived his life. Along the way, the genius of the text instructs us in how to read contemplatively, so that we live through this corrosive mental atmosphere with Ivan, and experience with him something of the indeterminacy of his self-questioning. "Ivan Ilych's physical sufferings were terrible, but worse than the physical sufferings were his mental sufferings, which were his chief torture" (153). One evening at a moment after his young assistant Gerasim had left him, he "wept like a child. He wept on account of his helplessness, his terrible loneliness, the cruelty of man, the cruelty of God, and the absence of God" (146). Though not at all religious, Ivan yet pleads with this absent God, "Why hast Thou brought me here? Why, why dost Thou torment me so terribly?" (146-47).

At this cathartic point in the narrative there's a break in the stream of Ivan's agonized thoughts as we're told, "Then he grew quiet, and not only ceased weeping but even held his breath and became all attention. It was as though he were listening not to an audible voice but to the voice of his soul, to the current of thoughts arising within him" (147). Through literary discourse the message intimated to us, coming "as though" from the interior of Ivan's mind, is the possibility that there can be an opening in the stream of consciousness, a moment of "quiet," even when immersed in extreme pain. The inner experience conveyed to the reader bears a resemblance to the quiet epiphany in Eliot's evocation of "the still point," in these arresting lines from *Four Quartets*,

After the kingfisher's wing  
Has answered light to light, and is silent, the light is still  
At the still point of the of the turning world.<sup>16</sup>

If as readers we pay the same kind of acute "attention" to the words in Tolstoy's text as Ivan pays to the "thoughts arising within him," we become "all attention" and "dwell in" the words, taking them as clues that we too, like Ivan, may come to discover similar existential meaning in our own life-world. We may realize similar acutely "quiet" states of mind that produce a restructuring of experience similar to what Ivan undergoes. The parallel intent between these passages from two acknowledged masterpieces by Tolstoy and Eliot can then be recognized as a clue, not simply to a similarity in people's subjective experiences, but to a single spiritual principle, coming to expression in different texts from different eras. Just as evidence from divergent sources converges to a single theory in science, when the scientist says "Aha, I've found it!," the post-critical reading of such different literary texts as those of Eliot and Tolstoy can spark the intuition and discovery that a single principle is at work in both.

Read in this way, the reference to inner stillness is not just a matter of idiosyncratic literary expression, but the evocation of an experience that is a clue to the possibility of new coherences in the life of the reader. Something factual is discovered in the tacit dimension of experience which may be found and validated again and again by different writers or readers. This *factual something* was called "spiritual fact" by Ralph Waldo Emerson in his 1836 treatise, *Nature*.<sup>17</sup> The display of realism in *The Death of Ivan Ilych*, without resort to fanciful or mythical language, shows an intent to convince readers that what Ivan experiences is a fact of the inner life, and may therefore be discovered anew by each reader in his or her unique context of experience. The language of the text is largely a set of concrete realistic clues which invite discovery of truths in the tacit dimension behind the words.

By observing "the current of thoughts" arising within ourselves, we go with Ivan through his various phases of pain and emerging self-awareness, culminating in a remarkable sense of stillness. And at a certain point we're invited by the text to experience a parallel sense of the discovery of "light." Without propositional

argument, the text leads us to one "actualization" after another, and as Iser argues "the aesthetic effect [of the literary work] results in a restructuring of experience."<sup>18</sup> Having undergone in the 1870s a spiritual awakening of his own, resulting in his conversion not to traditional Christian belief, but to a Christian anarchism based on his original reading of The New Testament, Tolstoy published *The Death of Ivan Ilych* in 1886. The story is not an argument for the existence of the soul, nor is it simply a realistic portrait of a man experiencing great distress followed by mental stillness in the midst of calamity. Its intent is rather to *show* the reader what's involved in the experience of listening to one's soul, by placing him inside Ivan's frame of mind at this climactic moment of awakening. The story enacts Conrad's proclamation of the writer's intent to make his reader hear, feel, and see dimensions of experience that might remain inaccessible apart from reading the work. By moving us into and through the stages of Ivan's developing insight, the story doesn't *tell*, but *leads* us to discover a fact in the tacit dimension of existence—that the soul (including the soul of the reader) can transcend utter despair.

The key is the soul's natural capacity to become "quiet." Identifying intersubjectively with Ivan, we learn, along with him, to listen to the soul's own "voice." As this inner listening leads Ivan to discover what is most authentic in his life—the spontaneity of childhood—and to reject the superficial objectivity that had held his whole personality captive as an adult, the story intimates that the same movement of soul is possible to the reader. The text is an invitation to participate in a literary rendering of the spiritual aspect of the tacit dimension, called in traditional terminology, *soul*. By its rendering of these phenomena, the story offers instruction to the reader in how to understand the tacit dimension in literary discourse, and to make one's own discoveries, parallel but not identical to Ivan's.

The artful handling of narrative point of view enables the reader to indwell the interior movements of Ivan's soul, presenting the reader with a cathartic purging of fear. It's felt as a release from the common presupposition that human existence is trapped in conditions defined by the objectivist framework. This release is a personal liberation involving a potential restructuring of experience. It starts by reading the text not as an object of analysis but as "a happening" in which "the experience of the reader [is] activated by this happening" (Iser 22). As an agent and participant in this happening the reader goes through the stages described in the narrative: (1) Ivan's rigid preoccupation with externals, stuck in the inert framework of *objectivism*; (2) a state of *contemplation*, or *indwelling* the topography of his interior landscape, resulting in the realization that his former life was "not real at all, but a terrible and huge deception which had hidden both life and death" (152); and (3) a final state of illumination bringing the discovery that "in place of death there was light" (156). In Ivan's final state, in place of the dark logic of the objectivist framework, he finds himself in a new framework of understanding capable of recognizing this interior (i.e. tacit) dimension of light.

In his final hours of life, Ivan undergoes a dramatic turning of consciousness. He sees what he has been blocked from seeing throughout his adult life by his conventional objectivist outlook. Confronting the reality of death, imagining that his breathless agony is due to his being thrust into a "black hole," "suddenly some force struck him in the chest and side, making it still harder to breathe, and he fell through the hole and there at the bottom was a light" (154). What is this "light"? A word for commonplace visual image in this context takes on metaphorical meaning. In Polanyian terms, the metaphor has power to "carry" a person "away" (M 71) not only to a new sense of reality, but to a new *framework* of pre-understanding that makes new understanding itself possible. In this case, a pair of contrasting metaphors carry the reader, along with Ivan, from the sense of being in a "black hole" to "light," signifying the onset of spiritual illumination. The archetypal word-image is designed to produce a similar epiphany in the reader, moving him from his customary patterns of thought, toward a new sense of what is happening in his own life-world.

To experience the "power of the written word" in metaphor requires indwelling the word, to live its indeterminacies, by developing a capacity to be in "uncertainties," "doubts," and "mysteries" (as Keats put it in describing the power he called "negative capability") without "any irritability reaching after fact and reason"<sup>19</sup>—that is, without retreating to a false sense of security in objectivist logic. In its literary context, the indeterminate meaning of "light" evoked in the reader by the metaphor illustrates the way tacit knowing works. As Polanyi argues in *The Tacit Dimension*, "the understanding of . . . works of art" can "be achieved only by indwelling." "Whenever we use certain things [e.g. word-images] for attending from them to other things [transcendental truths], in the way in which we always use our own body, these things change their appearance" (TD 16). Words change their meanings. By "entering into a work of art and thus dwelling in the mind of the creator" we enter a zone of potential discovery, similar to the frontier zone occupied by the artist in bringing the work of art into being.

As readers of Tolstoy, by practicing the very indwelling into which the text initiates us, we discover something about the mind of the artist, not by being told, but by being inducted into it by the tacit power of the written word. We get the "news" of Ivan's inner perspective on the experience of suffering, and his awakening to inner light, by indwelling the text. Combining the elements of literary discourse called *point of view* and *metaphor* the story creates the conditions for the epiphany of tacit knowing, a restructuring of the reader's own life-world.

Ivan had lived, we're told, within "screens" of self-delusion, blocking him from the direct realization of either life or death. When he becomes ill he finds through self-reflection that the "former current of [his] thoughts . . . had screened the thought of death from him. But strange to say, all that had formerly shut off, hidden, and destroyed, his consciousness of death, no longer had that effect" (132). "What was worst of all was that *it* [the thought of death] drew his attention to itself not in order to make him take some action but

only that he should look at *It*, look it straight in the face: look at it and without doing anything, suffer inexpressibly. And to save himself from this condition Ivan Ilych looked for consolations—new screens—and new screens were found and for a while seemed to save him, but then they immediately fell to pieces or rather became transparent, as if *It* penetrated them and nothing could veil *It*" (132-133).

Confronted involuntarily by the thought of death Ivan's mind is brought to laser focus in a way that he has never before experienced. He discovers the contemplative state. As we move with him into and through his stages of spiritual development, the text exercises a kind of magnetism that holds our attention, making us "see" and engaging our sensibility in the *happening* in its virtual field of events. At the same time the text gives instruction and encouragement about entering its field of indeterminate knowing, and from there to gain knowledge of the tacit dimension of existence that lies behind the screens of objectivist interpretation. Ultimately the screens all dissolve before Ivan's new inner sight. For us readers, to follow Ivan Ilych through the doors of perception requires us to dwell in the ambience of his world, exposing ourselves to its implications for our own experience.

"As observers or manipulators of experience we are guided by experience and pass *through* experience without experiencing it *in itself*," writes Polanyi (*PK* 197). By maintaining an objective stance toward the text, working either as analytical manipulators or as objective observers, we too pass through the experience of reading without experiencing it in itself. The news is offered, but we are not getting it.

The conceptual framework by which we observe and manipulate things being present as a *screen between ourselves and these things*, their sights and sounds, and the smell and touch of them transpire but tenuously through this screen, which keeps us aloof from them.

(*PK* 197, my italics)

But by turning our attention, not to the text as an object, but as a set of clues to the unknown, we find ourselves following Ivan's example, being "still" and "listening." What we hear are the nuances hidden in the tacit dimension of literary discourse. Near the end, by searching his consciousness for his accustomed sense of fear, Ivan comes to the startling realization "there was no fear because there was no death." In literary context this line presents itself to us as a clue to a possible discovery of our own, that neither fear nor death are what they appear to be, that our conventional views of them may be products of objectivist screens. But for Tolstoy, as for Polanyi "*contemplation dissolves the screen*, stops our movement through experience and pours us straight into experience; we cease to handle things and become immersed in them" (*PK* 197).

The screens constructed unconsciously by Ivan Ilych and his society masked the realities of both death and authentic life. In just this way the rigid assumptions of objectivism keep us "aloof" from the sensation of the realities of experience. From this pathology of separation, Tolstoy's story charts a path of

release. And Polanyi's philosophy offers explanation of the contemplative experience that makes such release possible.

Contemplation [he writes] has no ulterior intention or ulterior meaning; in it we cease to deal with things and become absorbed in the inherent quality of our experience, for its own sake. . . . [A]s we lose ourselves in contemplation, we take on an impersonal life in the objects of our contemplation. . . . [T]he impersonality of intense contemplation consists in a complete participation of the person in that which he contemplates . . . not in . . . detachment from it, as would be the case in an ideally objective observation. . . . The impersonality of contemplation is a self-abandonment . . . (PK 197)

The screen imposed by the objectivist framework artificially distances the person from the objects of sensory experience, leaving him stranded in "I-It" relations with other beings. "Contemplation" removes the screen, moving him toward "I-Thou" participation, in the paradox of *self-abandonment*. The "I" of the "I-Thou" relation is a different "I" from that of the "I-It" relation, as Martin Buber teaches.<sup>20</sup> The contemplative experience is a crucial aspect of personal knowledge at the height of intensity for the scientist. It is paradoxically "impersonal." The paradox in Polanyi's description is common to many accounts of spiritual experience and mystical union with God.<sup>21</sup> This is captured artfully by Tolstoy in one line, in which Ivan is portrayed as "knowing that He whose understanding mattered would understand." Polanyi implicitly draws a parallel between the experience of the mystic who breaks through the screens of ordinary perception to find the spiritual underpinnings of the visible world, and that of the scientist whose "intellectual passion" for discovery incites "heuristic vision," the "most radical manifestation" of which is the "urge to break through all fixed conceptual frameworks" (PK 197). This task of breaking through a fixed conceptual framework or tradition starts by indwelling, not the "picture" that holds us captive within the objectivist framework, but by indwelling the words and meanings of the text in the mental closet of contemplation.<sup>22</sup> Just as contemplative experience opens the astronomer to new knowledge of order in nature, the contemplative reading of poetic and literary texts can involve "breaking through" the "accepted frameworks of thought" (PK 199). In the process the reader is reorienting perception so that he sees more of the present possibilities of experience that had been separated from us by screens made of our own objectivist assumptions.

In a single moment, we're told, Ivan "caught sight of the light, and it was revealed to him that though his life had not been what it should have been, this could still be rectified. He asked himself, 'what is the right thing?' and grew still, listening." In this state of spontaneous contemplation,

. . . he felt that someone was kissing his hand. He opened his eyes, looked at his son, and felt sorry for him. His wife came up to him and he glanced at her. . . . He tried to add, "forgive me," but said "forgo" and waved his hand, knowing that He whose understanding mattered would understand. . . . He sought his former accustomed fear of death and did not find it. "Where is it? What death?" There was no fear because there was no death. In place of

death there was light. "So that's what it is!" he suddenly exclaimed aloud. "What joy!" To him all this happened in a single instant, and *the meaning of that instant did not change*. . . . "Death is finished," he said to himself. "It is no more!" He drew in a breath, stopped in the midst of a sigh, stretched out, and died (155-56, my italics).

The story is an exemplum, not of a stoical response to death, but of discovery that it is possible to "break out" of the fear of pain and one's own imminent death. By indwelling the artistic form of the text, the reader makes imaginative contact with the progression of Ivan's subjective states, in the process reorienting perception to see *from within* what Ivan sees and feels. The design of the text is not just to let us watch Ivan attain the experience of spiritual "light" but to bring us into a similar state of contemplation where we may discover the tacit coefficient of this enlightenment within ourselves. We learn, not by didactic instruction, but by participation, what's possible in the state of contemplation. The cathartic changes Ivan undergoes—including intense suffering, indwelling, and enlightenment, that together give new significance to his temporal life at its ending—are all presented as clues to existential meanings in the context of the reader's own life-world.

#### IV. Conclusion:

##### Getting Outside the Picture

"A picture held us captive" wrote Ludwig Wittgenstein in 1953. "And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably."<sup>23</sup> From a post-critical perspective, the metaphors "picture," "captivity," and "outside," point to the structural problem in modern life encapsulated by Polanyi in the term *objectivism*. Wittgenstein's "picture" conveys the sense of something "different and deeper than a theory. It is a largely unreflected-upon background understanding," as explained by Hubert Dreyfus and Charles Taylor.<sup>24</sup> This preconceptual background-understanding "provides the context and thus influences all our theorizing," putting constraints on all or most thought and language use within its borders. The phenomenon of a "not fully explicit picture" in the deep semantic structure of language, approximates what Polanyi means by the term "framework." For Dreyfus and Taylor, the picture refers to the categorical split between the subject and object of knowing in modern philosophy. In their view the picture of dualism "has been a kind of captivity, because it has prevented us from seeing what is wrong with this whole line of thought." At crucial points, philosophers are unable to think "outside the box," because "the picture seems so obvious, so commonsensical, so unchallengeable" (DT 2).

From the standpoint of Polanyian epistemology we could say the problem stems from the objectivist framework, which in its extreme forms maintains the fiction that every thing is simply an object, with no ancillary dimensions. including the body, mind, passion, creativity, and all other aspects of the human reality. But we may say the picture and our submission to its systems of logic have consequences more severe than the intellectual impasse described by Dreyfus and Taylor. This underlying belief, which would have scandalized our forebears in earlier centuries, has in Polanyi's view exercised "a destructive influence"

(*PK* vii) in the world, by diverting scientists from their most vital resource, the tacit dimension of knowing. But by reducing the whole of the human reality—including mind, body, passion, etc.—to objecthood, it has also "falsified our whole outlook far beyond the domain of science" (*PK* vii), and Polanyi believed it responsible in some measure for the dehumanization and murder of millions in Europe, the Soviet sphere, and China in mid-twentieth century.

"To identify the picture would be to grasp a big mistake, something like a framework mistake, which distorts our understanding, and at the same time prevents us from seeing this distortion for what it is" (DT 2). The idea of a framework-mistake implies a mistaken set of fundamental assumptions that have a powerful influence on thought and behavior of all who live within range of those assumptions. The difficulty of getting outside the picture is because its elements (subject separated from object) "lay in our language" as Wittgenstein puts it. If this is so, the work of overcoming this difficulty and so rectifying the mistaken picture of reality begins by developing new forms of language.

Turning to the rich field of literary discourse we find powerful clues to a new kind of inquiry, oriented like that of the poet not to formulaic rules, but to the art of tacit knowing. As the poet uses words not primarily to re-present reality but more as clues to "look at the unknown," the philosopher may develop a new kind of discipline capable of thinking outside the box. In doing so she may become a heuristic thinker capable not only of gaining new understanding of facts, but participating in the envisioning and design of an emerging framework of understanding. Polanyi's thought unveils the rudiments of such a newly emerging framework of understanding, based on the principles of tacit knowing in which real thinking is discovery.

Continuing to build on the rudiments laid down by Polanyi involves recognizing the capacity of language to touch the tacit dimension of existence. This creative capacity of language is abundantly evident in poetic discourse. But it is also present in the work of philosophers, including Polanyi, Merleau-Ponty, Bergson, Heidegger, William James, Wittgenstein, Stanley Cavell, and many others. When thinking becomes contemplation, like Tolstoy's suffering anti-hero or Stevens's interior paramour, we learn to dissolve the screens that block our self-knowledge of the tacit dimension of consciousness and involuntarily divorce ourselves from perception of *what is*. In the universe as portrayed by Michael Polanyi the screens are those of the objectivist framework. These are seen to dissolve in the light of contemplation or indwelling the actual phenomena of experience, and treating the particulars of language as clues to more advanced understanding of what's happening. It is the act of indwelling that enables one to get the news of the ontological aspect of tacit knowing in poetry and literary texts. The poet looks beyond the known, using words not as direct representations of objective fact, but as clues to discovery of greater coherence in reality than previously known, as we've seen in Tolstoy and Stevens's metaphors of "light."

Escape from our captivity to the picture of objectivism is found, not by rooting around in language games acceptable within the framework of objectivism. It requires switching frameworks. This paper is a proposal for further research and inquiry into making such a framework switch. Following the map of the intellectual frontier drawn by Polanyi we see tacit knowing as the way toward discovery. And understanding literary discourse as a means of breaking out of the objectivist framework is one leading edge in the discovery process. If literary metaphor springs from the "ontological aspect of tacit knowing," it points a way "outside" the "picture" of objectivism. The structure of metaphor, its ability to transfer attention from the explicit image to a tacit referent of greater significance, is a demonstration of how tacit knowing works to alter perception. It is a clue to the way language becomes a tool to break out of a mistaken picture of reality, and to see more of what is real. Post-critical philosophy, like literary discourse, has the effect of undoing the assumptions of objectivism embedded in modern thought, and enabling us to access this "more." As the vehicle in metaphor makes a connection to an indeterminate something in the tenor, the thought of the reader is made to connect to a reality beyond his ken. It is this pre-logical connecting power of language that shows promise of getting outside the picture of an objectivist universe, and is an essential building block in the emerging post-critical framework of understanding envisioned by Polanyi.

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#### Notes

<sup>1</sup> William Carlos Williams, from "Asphodel, That Greeny Flower" (1955) in Cary Nelson, ed., *Anthology of Modern American Poetry* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 200.

<sup>2</sup> Michael Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962; paperback, 1974; orig. publ. London: Routledge, 1958), 127-128, italics in original. Hereafter cited as *PK*.

<sup>3</sup> Polanyi, *The Tacit Dimension* (London: Penguin, 2009, orig. publ. 1966), 13 and passim, hereafter cited in text as *TD*.

<sup>4</sup> Polanyi's preferred term is "contemplation" (see *PK* 195-202) which in his thought bears a generic resemblance to Heidegger's "meditative thinking." On the distinction between "meditative" and "calculative thinking" see Martin Heidegger, *Discourse on Thinking*, tr. John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund (New York: Harper, 1966; orig. publ. as *Gelassenheit*, 1959), esp. "Memorial Address," 43-58.

<sup>5</sup> Richard Gelwick, *The Way of Discovery: An Introduction to the Thought of Michael Polanyi* (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2004; orig. publ. Oxford University Press, 1977) pp. 43-44; Polanyi, *Science, Faith, and Society*, (1964 ed.), 32

<sup>6</sup> T.S. Eliot, "Little Gidding," in *Four Quartets* (1942), *The Complete Poems and Plays 1909-1950* (New York: Harcourt, 1952), 143.

<sup>7</sup> Eliot, "The Music of Poetry," *On Poetry and Poets* (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux/Noonday, 1973), 22-23.

<sup>8</sup> In a traditional Mexican folksong, we're told,  
                   In order to dance the Bamba  
                   one must have a little grace,  
                   a little grace and another little thing.  
                   And hurrah I will go, for you I will exist: Bamba  
                   I'm not a sailor, I'm a captain.  
                   "La Bamba," Spanish, with English tr. *Golden Encyclopedia of Folk Music*  
                   (Milwaukee, WI: Hal Leonard Corp., n.d.), 314.

Though "a little grace" is requisite, the "other little thing" one must have in order to dance is to cross the boundary that separates subject from object, surrendering one's very self to the dance: "for you I will exist: Bamba." The act of self-surrender, a form of ultimate indwelling, is what brings discovery. This is stated in the song as a realization of new identity: "I'm not a sailor, I'm a captain." If we take the poetic text not as a declarative statement, but as an invitation to let go of conventional preconceptions about language and experience, we enter into the dynamics of poetic language. Understanding the words of the text is seeing beyond their denotative meanings, which here tell us only a fantasy of a man being dramatically changed. But if we look at the words as an intimation of something perceived tacitly in a more subtle dimension of the human reality, we find in the words an invitation to experience a fact about the human reality: the potential to enter a new phase of identity, transfigured as from sailor to captain, or from apprentice to master.

<sup>9</sup> Eliot, from "The Dry Salvages" part IV, in *Four Quartets*, 136.

<sup>10</sup> Polanyi, "The Creative Imagination" in *The Concept of Creativity in Science and Art*, ed. Denis Dutton and Michael Krausz (The Hague, Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981) 91-108, orig. publ. 1966, hereafter cited as *CI*.

<sup>11</sup> Joseph Conrad, Preface to *The Nigger of the Narcissus* (New York: Doubleday, 1930).

<sup>12</sup> Stevens, "Final Soliloquy of the Interior Paramour" in *The Palm at the End of the Mind* (New York: Vintage, 1972), 367-368.

<sup>14</sup> Leo Tolstoy, *The Death of Ivan Ilych and Other Stories* (New York: Signet, 1960), 104.

<sup>15</sup> Wolfgang Iser, *The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 24.

<sup>16</sup> Eliot, from "Burnt Norton" part IV, in *Four Quartets*, 121.

<sup>17</sup> Emerson, *Nature*, in *Selected Essays* (New York: Viking Penguin, 1982), 35-82, Part IV "Language," 48-55.

<sup>18</sup> Iser, 24.

<sup>19</sup> John Keats, "Negative Capability," from "Letter to George and Thomas Keats," in *The Critical Tradition: Classic Texts and Contemporary Trends*, ed. David H. Richter, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 1998), 336.

<sup>20</sup> Martin Buber, *I and Thou*, tr. Ronald Gregor Smith, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (New York: Scribner's, 1958), 3.

<sup>21</sup> See Bernard McGinn, *The Foundations of Mysticism, vo. 1 of The Presence of God: A History of Western Mysticism* (New York: Crossroad, 1991), xvii, 32-33, 47-52, and passim.

<sup>22</sup> See Thomas Merton, "What is Contemplation?" in *New Seeds of Contemplation* (New York: New Directions, 2007), 1-6.

<sup>23</sup> Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1965; orig. publ. 1953), 48, para. 115.

<sup>24</sup> Hubert Dreyfus and Charles Taylor, chap. 1 "A Picture Held us Captive," in *Retrieving Realism* (Cambridge: Harvard, 2015), 1, hereafter cited as DT.