

Saturday Morning Transcript

1993 Polanyi Society with Poteat Saturday Morning #1

Charles McCoy, moderator, calls attention to the arrangement of the chairs in the room as a response to the discussion on Friday night of typical university seating arrangements and practices by contrast with Poteat's commitments to first person, face to face communication as in the classical polis. Difficult to arrange rooms for the benefit of the educational process rather than for the janitors and the people who run the place...

Charles McCoy:: Now this morning I was hoping we might focus, at least initially, on some of the differences, or similarities, between the thought of Bill Poteat and Michael Polanyi. Last night I think we were elaborating more the convictions and thinking of Bill Poteat in his writing. And this morning, though you can never control where the discussion will go, I would suggest that we might start out at least by asking Bill some questions about how he sees his own thought in relation to Polanyi.

I've always regarded Bill not only as "Polanyi East" if that is the right phrase to use but also as one of those great allies in attempting to undermine the critical perspective in modern life and make possible the emergence of a post-critical era...and, of course, I see Michael Polanyi as very crucial in that kind of development and Bill as following him...

Last night he said something though that made me wonder about that a little bit.... He said that *Polanyian Meditations* was misnamed and should be "Toward a Post-Critical Philosophy" with a subtitle perhaps suggested by a passage on page 191 of *Personal Knowledge*...

I would like to hear Bill talk about that a little more and the overall relationship he sees between his own thought and that of Michael Polanyi. I think that would be a very interesting thing and perhaps I can tease it out a little bit more.

For example, Bill talked about seeing his own work as carrying out a Copernican Revolution. Now, in my own thinking about Polanyi, it seems to me as though the Copernican Revolution was of a fickle sort in the centuries that preceded the critical period and permeates the critical period in a certain way and that the post critical period is inaugurated by what I would call the Polanyian Revolution.

Now I would like to see Bill talk about what he sees as the relationship between the Copernican Revolution and the Polanyian Revolution because I think that would help us see what it is ... what his own thought is carrying out that is in comparison with and in contrast with the thought of Michael Polanyi.

There is another element that I think it would be interesting to hear about also, and that's a comparison and contrast of the relation of action and language in Polanyi and how Bill sees this in his own work. There are times when I read *The Philosophical Daybook*, for example, when I have a feeling that Bill is more in the linguistic school of philosophy but he is carrying out some very significant modifications and changes and that the Copernican Revolution that he is carrying out really is in reference to the misunderstandings and misleading aspects of the school of linguistic philosophy...Wittgenstein and others in that field, you know the group that took two decades to learn that ordinary language is not that which is spoken in the senior common room of Maudlin? Oxford. This was quite a move for them when they discovered that of course

(Bill's comment inaudible...maybe "They slowed?")...McCoy repeats in agreement and laughter)

So I would like to see Bill locating himself. I would like to hear how he locates himself with reference to his own Copernican Revolution with reference to that linguistic school and compare how he sees himself in relation to Polanyi, who I see as taking an even further move beyond simply showing the difficulties of the linguistic school.

And it seems to me that one of the places where that might focus is in the relation between action and language. Of course the linguistic school at Oxford through its Berkeley branch ...Searle....at least began extending speech into speech acts....?they were relating to action....

I would like to see how Bill carries this forward and sees the Copernican Revolution in his own thought bears in relation to what I would call the Polanyian Revolution which seems to me to go further.

Now there may be some other things but that should get us started out and perhaps set the tone of where we are going...

6:21

(inaudible)...“and we will only consider the subject matter of volumes 1 and 2...”

Poteat: ...Well this is a very tantalizing invitation and I am going to accept it up to the limits of my capacity to do this, which I should forewarn you are quite limited because I have never been a student of Polanyi.

And in that fact alone...and I'll tell you what I mean by that because obviously I see expressions of dismay, perplexity, Oh my Godthere is more of this coming

No less an authority than Nickell and Stines in the introduction to their recently published volume have touted me as one of the great interpreters of Polanyi in the contemporary philosophical scene.

This is just plain not so...there are many people...many in this room who are far better interpreters of Polanyi than I ever was and certainly that I ever aspired to be...

Now this will help you to understand better some of the things that I as saying about teaching with concrete reference to the questions that Charlie has raised...

When I say that I have never been a student of Polanyi, I mean that my interest in him has not been scholarly in any way at all because he has never tempted me, nor indeed have the writings of any other seminal thinker tempted me to exegete that text with as much fidelity as my capacity permitted...

That kind of a relationship to a text is not only not one that I never had in relation to the text of *Personal Knowledge* and Polanyi's other writings but of any other....

I mentioned last night using Hannah Arendt's *The Human Condition* as a text in an upper-level undergraduate course and I don't consider myself, even though I have gone through that text at least 25 times with students, as being any kind of an authority on the thought of Hannah Arendt. Taylor Scott is much more of a scholar of Hannah Arendt than I am...

The point that I am trying to make is not simply of anecdotal interest but of philosophic interest...that is a text for me is the basis upon which I enter into a colloquy with the thinker before me and *introject* what the author is saying *to me* and therefore I would never want to say the interpretation of this is so and so.

The same is true of my relationship to the texts of Kierkegaard...I have lifelong read Kierkegaard in this funny way I have with books...that is I am looking for something that is speaking to me out of this text and if you say, well, he didn't mean that, I will say "I don't care!"

Now this is why, I mean this attitude of mine is one of the many reasons why I was never awarded a James. B. Duke Professorship or have been elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Now let me see if I can make clear what I am trying to say about this. I don't know anything anymore about Polanyi's thought and certainly not more than anybody else...what I know is that I have had this lifelong relationship ...most especially to the man... who to me was the very embodiment of human greatness.

And it will surprise you to learn than though I have spent many hours and days and months in the company of Michael Polanyi, as often as not as his body servant and grateful for this privilege.... we almost never had philosophical discussions.

Now you might say what an opportunity to throw away.... you could have asked him so and so and found out what he really meant...and the fact is, in the accepted sense of this, *I didn't care what he really meant.*

Now that, as you can see Charlie, this puts me in a very bad position to comment at length on how I differ from Polanyi; because this suggests there is something out there known as Polanyi and I am in a position to say how what is in this book differs from that. I hope you will understand that I am not at all trivializing the import or the importance of your question. I am trying to put it into the focus that enables me to comment upon it.

Having said that, let me show you, that in the text of *Personal Knowledge* Polanyi is at once, within the space of say 350 to 400 words, a creature of the Copernican Revolution that I have been trying to embody in my books and a creature of the critical point of view which he is at pains to set aside.

Wally Mead sent me a paper the other day and calls attention to this in the body of *Personal Knowledge*. It is a contradiction that I has noted many times before for myself....I've gotten this book so written up I can't find the page number..... but the sentence – the famous sentence on 191 which is the basis of the attitude that is being bestowed upon me here now.

191 Polanyi says "Our acceptance of what is logically anterior is based on our prior acceptance of what is logically derivative, as being implied in our acceptance of the latter."

Now using my language, Polanyi is up to his groin in the Copernican Revolution that I am talking about here. He clearly apprehends the problem about axiomatization in math, which is the immediate context of this but it applies throughout, in the temporal pretensive retrotensive dynamic that we apprehend through our own mindbodily existence. And so when I made this an epigraph to *Polanyian Meditations* I thought that this was indeed the heart of this book for me and I took a great deal of time trying to unpack that sentence.

In other words, Polanyi has *given in*...in saying those words...in writing those words...*he has given in to the sovereignty of his own embedded language*. He is caught in the midst of the pretensive-retrotensive dynamic of living mindbodily in the world where you distinguish between the logically anterior that is based on our prior acceptance of what is logically derivative.

Now when I first read that I said that can only be understood in musical terms, that is in terms such as we would employ in order to show the difference between one note and then another note and then another note, on the one hand, and a melody where the first note pretends the second note and the second note retrotends the first note.

Now about 350 words further on in the text still talking about axiomatization ...this is page 192...he says "Let us remember once more that logical antecedents derived from the prior acceptance of their consequents are necessarily less certain than the consequents."

Now that is doubly odd because he is reminding the reader and clearly reminding himself of how he thinks about the relationship between a logical antecedent and a logical consequent. And he occupies the relationship to his own words that is classically abstract logical. In other words he is denying in what he says in this most recently quoted line, what he has said in the previously quoted line. In other words, he has backslid from the Copernicanism that I am claiming is to be found in the first passage I have quoted in the second one.

Now, you know I am not making a big deal of this ...I am rather trying to make...trying to illustrate in a rather concrete way how it is possible at once or successively to be fully Copernican, to use my language, on one page and pre-Copernican, or critical on the next page.

Now I have not gone through the text of *Personal Knowledge* looking for further evidences of his Copernicanism or of his lapses from Copernicanism.... that is the sort of thing that a responsible scholar would do ...and maybe one of you in here will do that, now that you have heard about this thing being there.

But Charlie, in an oblique way, I see my calling attention to the juxtaposition of these two propositions in which Polanyi's relation to his own words is different in one from the other as being some kind of comment upon the question "How do you differ from Polanyi and how are you like him?" and the answer is "I am like him on 191 and I am different from him on 192." (Laughter) and that is about all I have to say on that.

20:18

Charles McCoy: "That does it"

Poteat: And that is very disappointing, I know, because you were looking forward to having the whole morning filled with this sort of thing.

Now, what was the second volume going to be, Charlie?

Charles McCoy: The relation of action and language I think was the general topic I suggested for the second volume...

Richard Gelwick: Before we go to the next volume can we pursue the first one?

Poteat: Certainly..certainly... pursue away, Richard..

Richard Gelwick: You know very well my appreciation...inaudible..but if it is true what you said ...trying to figure out how to formulate this...The difference that stands out between Bill Poteat and Michael Polanyi....Polanyi was trying to start something ...(inaudible) which might ...for what you call lapses....he himself was not aware of the way that he was turning language..

Poteat: Right.

Gelwick: But the thing when I compare you (inaudible) Polanyi was also somewhat concerned about another issue that doesn't stand out... a free society... but again that is historical...that is his setting..

In a way you have taken up a task and taken it inside Polanyi..that is what I felt when I *read Polanyian Meditations*... I was trying to walk through, maybe for the first time, really thinking for the first time in a post-critical way..

I was not sure after having done that how this still would affect Polanyi because I was trying to think what would he be doing today if he were still around...I think he probably would be doing some things about a lot of political issues

22:50

Poteat: yes...yes...yes..

Gelwick: So I don't know.....So that is a difference ...maybe too obvious to comment on

Poteat: It isn't...it isn't too obvious to comment on and indeed you are right to remind us of that and also to suggest what is the case that I have not in any of my writing dealt with that whole dimension of Polanyi's own writings which are concerned with ethics, public policy, the community upon which science is based which is his particular model for talking about that upon which all community is based...

Inaudible comment – suggestion ...?But you attack the disease which underlies those problems?"

Poteat: It is just partly a difference between two kinds of intellectual temperament, and I think an interesting anecdote on this point...is helpful...

When I first showed Michael the rough draft of what later became the chapter in *Intellect and Hope*...I met him at the Carolina Inn on a beautiful Sunday morningwe had breakfast and he had the paper and read it and held it on his lap and patted it, and I thought that was pretty ominous right there, and said: "I think this is very important"

Which I hope you will understand I mean no disrespect by observing that this meant "I don't know what you are talking about" but then he went on to say "You know, Bill, we have to be quite strict now."

I found that fascinating in a man who had devoted so much energy and writing to attacking false ideals of strictness and exhaustibility. But then I realized well that's a trivial kind of biographical fact about Michael Polanyi. What is of interest here is that in saying, "we have to be quite strict," he was saying "you can't talk this way about such questions." He would never have said that and, indeed, I doubt if he even thought that. What I am suggesting is that he felt uncomfortable with the kind of thing that I was doing there and that clearly anticipated what I came later on to do in these books.

Now, let me make one further point about a difference between Polanyi and me. And it is a very funny question for me to be putting to myself and trying to answer because it is just, I don't know, it's weird, but I know that we are in a weird environment even for the Polanyi Society.

26:40

Charles McCoy: And the AAR appropriately meets near the Zoo, too.

Poteat: Well, what I want to say is that it is interesting to compare the impact of the reiteration of the from-to, tacit-explicit image with the retrotensive-pretensive image that I find central to what I am trying to do. In other words, Polanyi knows full well in the sentence on 191 that the antecedent retrotends...sorry, the consequent retrotends the antecedent as the antecedent pretends the consequent. And I am not suggesting that he would deny what I am saying here, because he said it here, but I am suggesting that one of the ways that he commits the *faux pas* as I am claiming it to be on the next page is that he was seduced by his own image of from-to because he does not accompany this with a to-from .

I don't think that this difference between us is of great deal of importance except insofar as it sheds some kind of light on what's going on in these books of mine.

Now have I been properly responsive to your concern here Richard with what I have said?

Richard: I think so..it was what I expected ...one of the differences (inaudible)

29:00

Poteat: I think that when Polanyi said "We have to be quite strict here" is we have to be "up front" – a phrase that he, though he was quite fond of using American colloquialisms, I don't think he would have used in this case.

His mode of argumentation was very conventional and he used with great effect his vast command of scientific illustrations to support his argument which could be supported by and illustrated with models from other fields.

Now to get to action and speech.

Like everyone, you included, Charlie, in the 50's and the 60's...mostly in the fifties ...I read all of the Oxford ordinary language stuff and in 52 when *Philosophical Investigations* came out in translation I participated in a joint UNC/Duke Philosophy Department Seminar which met

(break while tape is changed)

30:38

The sole exception in my experience being the faculty of Guilford College where I conducted some seminars and to my great astonishment I found this going on there too...its Quakerism that does it..

Someone: It's still going one....

Poteat: To put a long story short, as I read these materials, I kept saying to myself "There is nobody there!" Even, when you read the *Philosophical Investigations*, you imagine Wittgenstein, lecturing in his

rooms, leaning up against the wall with his eyes shut talking what later came to be written down as *Philosophical Investigations*.

In other words, for all of the fact that he frequently introduces an imaginary interlocutor to which he then offers an answer or a comment.....the *Philosophical Investigations* are anything but oral/aural. Now this is in no sense to diminish their enormous power and value and their influence on my thinking.

But I kept wanting to say, "If the meaning of a word is its use in the language then what about the user?" Because I kept feeling that I was a *user* and that the relationship that stood between the meaning of the word in the language that I used and my subscription to that usage was central to the whole business about language. And in terms of what was being said last night in various ways about what I described as my Yahwism, I suppose that it was my Yahwism coming out at the point where I felt that the linguistic philosophers who were doing such exciting things were in the last analysis aesthetes in the Kierkegaardian sense. Oh they were serious ... in pursuing their various dialectical explorations but in a funny sense there was nobody there in the sense in which Abraham was there when Yahweh spoke to him and Abraham, now Abraham, previously known as Abram, answered.

So my interest in speech and action turned around that image. And this is why I believe that if you wanted to try to come up, which I don't necessarily want to do, but if you wanted to come up with a model of what it is for us to be men and women, I would say we are distinguished from all other beings by the fact that we have the possibility of speech and of taking responsibility for speech. And this precisely constitutes our freedom and our transcendence.

Now did you have more that you were hoping for....

35:02

Charles McCoy: Well I think that defines your own position quite clearly and it may be that it isn't relevant as to what you think Polanyi would say on this point but I'd be interested to see if you have a view on that because it seems to me that Polanyi does not take that point of view.

Poteat: He doesn't and he is, indeed, as you will remember there is a footnote in there about Wittgenstein whom he simply more or less summarily writes off, and with all due respect to Marjorie Grene, this is Marjorie Grene's fingerprints in the text, because Marjorie to this day, has little good to say about Wittgenstein...or anybody else...(long loud laughter)

?Beth Newman?: I wanted to go back to the question about language...I think the direction that would help me is if you talk about the difference between what you are saying and what Wittgenstein was saying Wittgenstein, when he says the meaning of a word is its use Is slightly different from what I hear you saying when you say language is in the sinews of our bodies. I feel like I can grasp fairly easily the notion that concepts come out of our bodies. The visual world even though dynamic is often crystallized into this static objectivism..

But when I think about words...individual words...it is more difficult. So the long section where you talk about *tendare* and tension and retrotension and deriving from our mindbodies there seems to be a kind of, for lack of a better word, an intuitionism or a jump that you have that it is hard for me to follow exactly and I think if you will maybe address...

(Several talking at once, Maybe Arimenta? Jumps in, apparently clarifying whether he includes Wittgenstein with others in his criticism as being aesthetes..but inaudible)

Poteat: Now it is very hard to think of Wittgenstein as an aesthete. I think that the point has been made and I think been established that with Wittgenstein. ...Wittgenstein's interest in language, and this dates all the way back to the *Tractatus*, is in the service of clearing the deck of everything that can be said in order that that which can't be said, namely that which shows itself...which is of the ultimate interest to Wittgenstein and his ethics...

But even so, I assent to the proposition that you've suggested here that Wittgenstein, in common with these other linguistic philosophers, and of philosophy especially in the modern period, generally is aesthetic in the Kierkegaardian sense.

38:38

Now to get to you question Beth, my disposition on the etymology of the word "tend," and I will not rehearse that, but you will know where to find it in *Polanyian Meditations* is that this word, and all of its cognates and all of its etymological roots all the way back to Sanskrit, is a particularly useful way to illustrate the point that I am trying to make about language being rooted in our mindbodies and that is:

How can you understand the word "intend" without apprehending that in the intentionality of your act of reaching for something. So all of the...so the Sanskrit roots *tin tan ton and tun* ...the consonant in there allows for these variations that issue in the whole history of the meaning of this word... in every one of its cognates and branches **one apprehends that word in one's body as an intentional being. And if you weren't** then none of this would make any sense to you.

Now I don't recall that I use this illustration for this purpose. Taylor in his piece in *Tradition and Discovery* made considerable use of it and elaborates on it in a most interesting way in the relationship between his grandson and his daughter-in-law as she is feeding her infant. But he cites the experiments that were made at Edinburgh by a group of psychologists, one of whom was clever enough to devise a way of filming the behavior of neonates, sometimes less than a month old and slowing the photographs ...the motion pictures that he was taking...slowing them down in such a way that he could show, that it was not the case, as had been previously supposed, that the movements of the hands and feet of neonates are random, simply random discharges of energy, but were in fact coordinated in a positively balletic way with the rhythms in which their mothers spoke to them.

I've never seen these movies and I am reporting on a written report of all of this. But it is a marvelous experiment, It is the sort of thing that Polanyi would characterize as a "beautiful experiment" because what it shows is that, before we are a month old, we are already dwelling in the rhythms of our ambient world that we apprehend both as the sound of the loving voice of our mothers and the rhythms of their movement as they hold, support, fondle, caress, and talk babytalk to us. And as one of these authors observed, when we talk babytalk to our children we are recovering our own pre-verbal powers which were themselves the condition of our having acquired language and the way you talk to a baby is with babytalk, except some exceptionally modern liberal parents who want to open the day with a reading from the transcendental deduction of the categories from the *First Critique*.

Now am I getting....

(Beth: yes that helps..)

Poteat: I know why you are asking this because I know intellectually where you live and so I am eager to contribute to the development of your interest here...What else do you need to know about this?

Beth: No I think that helps clarify for me, particularly when you talk about reaching for something physically and that the child – the pre-condition for learning language is being embodied personally, so I think that clarifies it for me..

Poteat: Well Beth, you and I are on exceptionally good terms with AT&T. If this is truncated, give me a ring. Even though if your husband went to the Notre Dame game, for which I can forgive you but not him..(laughter)

44:56

Walter?

Walter Gulick: This discussion really raises a plethora of possible responses. But I want to go first of all to your comment about the from-to versus the to-from...It would seem to me that Polanyi would agree (inaudible) that when we dwell in a particular from which we think to a certain focal meaning, we then may indwell that meaning, and when we indwell that meaning we have the potential to think from again...a kind of circular pattern...

So in the music setting we would be not only indwelling the notes at the moment but the sense of how the melody is going at the same time....So there is a kind of mutuality

Does that get at the point that you were making?

Poteat: Yes, I absolutely agree and in order to make a point I vastly oversimplified the import of the from-to image in Polanyi's thought because he clearly is not as simple minded as my use of that particular illustration might have suggested. I am rather more interested, not in what it does to Polanyi, as for what it does to us. And if we are not careful, than we can be easily seduced by the spatial metaphor underlying the from-to – particularly if you think of from-to as going from here to there, with the consequence that when you are here you are no longer there. So yes, I certainly subscribe to what you have said.

You said you had a plethora, so let's have it..

47:13

Walter Gulick: One more...last night what I heard in the kind of community of discourse that you created last night. I guess my question has to do with world versus world. I certainly understand what you are saying when you say that our discussion opens up a new world. (someone interjects: Conjures) Conjures up a new world. That's right. A new world that was not before. (inaudible)

My question is how do these various worlds that are formed relate to *the world*. Is the notion of *the world* a notion that you feel comfortable with and is it something that we are all grounded in...Would you want to get at that with some kind of hierarchical view....How would you want to deal with perhaps the issue almost of truth. Are you going to mainly subscribe to a correspondence, I mean a coherence

theory of truth ...that is what I am hearing... I was having some Hegelian overtones in hearing what you say.

Poteat: Oh Good heavens... (laughter)

Walter Gulick continues: Or do you want ..I think Polanyi would certainly prefer much more a sort of correspondence theory...Do you want to subscribe to that?

Poteat: No! I don't want to subscribe to any of that. The very ... With all due respect I am going to come quite bluntly at what you have said and almost every one of the familiar philosophical categories that you have offered me as options – like a coherence theory, or a correspondence theory, and the questions as to **the** world and **a** world...

All of these are rendered moot by what I tried to describe last night as a Copernican Revolution. Now I have no trouble...I am just like everybody else in this room...I use the word "world "in a very commonsensical way...

(changing tape) Poteat quips: They do this better at Furman than at Francis Marion.....lots of laughter and kidding..."They do everything better" ..."Be careful your Baptist heritage is showing" ...

Poteat continues: Now, lest I come over as too much of a smart ass – which I am but try not to come over as–

Do you understand what I mean when I say that the coherence versus the correspondence theory is rendered moot by what I have been trying to argue?

Walter Gulick: I hear you saying that but I don't agree.

Poteat: Yeah, You don't agree, I would argue, because you are still a creature of Ptolemaisism....

And what to do with someone like you? And I think probably.... (Lots of laughter through here)

Walter Gulick: I like Kant, I am really bad off...

Poteat: You are bad off only when you are at a meeting of the Polanyi Society at the AAR because otherwise you are just an ordinary human being that gets around quite satisfactorily from one thing to the next without having a coherence as opposed to a correspondence theory of truth...all of these things were made up..and we don't need them...indeed in specific cases they could be quite misleading ...

But let me be fair here and say the choice between coherence and correspondence is rendered moot as a theory of truth...are rendered moot when the nature of the relationship that obtains between you and the world – whether that is the world in this room that we all at the moment share or is something else altogether. You can't even get a surgical scalpel between you and the world in which at the moment you are dwelling...so you then don't have a problem of how do you get from here to there...because you are already there...

Walter: Let me try to respond....

Charles McCoy: Walter could I interject a question quickly: Would you agree that from your understanding of Polanyi that he would also say those questions are moot?

Poteat: He wouldn't say that.

McCoy: What would he say?

Poteat: I think he would say what he does say in this book...and I believe that what he says in this book that bears on the question you are raising here is in the invocation of the notion of assertion with universal intent, and I, myself, feel a bit uncomfortable with this because it seems to me that Polanyi is betraying...no that is too strong a word...he suggests that *we need something to account for the fact that we have a coherent world* and that thing that is needed and that he supplies is the notion of universal intent.

Now this is a fine distinction and one that I, you know, have no investment in whatsoever, but I am trying to answer your question as honestly as I can.

McCoy: A *fine* distinction can be taken in two ways.

Poteat: At least..I'll bet you I could come up with

McCoy: But it doesn't seem to necessarily imply a coherence or a correspondence theory of truth and I wonder if it doesn't moot it in fact..

Poteat: Well..it's mooted ...let me speak for myself...coherence is an actuality upon which we rely literally every moment of our lives in a thousand and one different ways. There is nothing problematic – I wager that there is nothing problematic for anyone in this room about how to get from here to the men's or ladies' room.

McCoy: Except a linguistic problem because it says gentleman and I want to know where the rest of us go ...

Poteat: I thought you were going to call attention to the fact that the Shorham has backslid into referring to females when there are ladies....

Moderator: No they say women and Gentleman...this is one of the things that has interested me about the linguistic choice...excuse me

Poteat: Now let me get back to you...we have left you there with a plethora, Walt...

Walter Gulick: I want to speak a little bit about what you said about reality. Let me give a reading that (unfortunately long section is only audible in fragments but I have picked out some words)

I heard you, in the way you dealt with Kant in saying that even the idea of the thing itself ???inaudiblemay say moot but I want to try it anyway ??? beyond Hegelian notion of reason??important???a move that I really subscribe to??....

But I want to say that there is something more than that....I guess I want to affirm something like the thing itself as ?? that we are embodied in....

I want to say that ???affirm about the thing itself

As that which we share in common ...true when we articulate it ... raise it to the level of language

So I guess a way of getting at my concern is, going back to Polanyi's from-to structure

In my own thinking making a from-via-to...the via plays an interpretive a mediating role from that embodied aspect....transformed linguistically into something that can be ?????communicate...

It seems to me that what I hear you saying ????????

Poteat: clarifying??? Inaudible

58:40

Walter Gulick: It is increasingly mysterious at the roots of our being? When you get to skills that we are not conscious of,...semi-conscious of..so forth

Poteat: Well I think that the difference between us is perhaps nonexistent entirely or at the most minor. I want to say that the world... I use that word without any heavy freight upon it ??? that the world is what we all know it to be and if it is a consolation to you I am perfectly happy to say it is out there and not in here.

At the very moment that you and I are tending these words it's right there between us embodied in what you say and what I say and the corporeal setting out of which you say what you say and that out of which I say what I say and so on.... We don't need all of that...

In other words, if you are fearful that I am some kind of an idealist, I would simply say, "Wrong" because idealism gets its traction from the option realism/idealism and what I am trying to argue renders that distinction moot by finding the ground upon which all meaning and meaning discernment derive and to which they retortend.

And I guess that is all I have to say

Dale – you wanted to interject something?

Dale Cannon: I wanted to suggest it might be helpful...

(Recording cuts off as tape is changed....picks up later in Poteat's response?)